Cumulative Voting in the United States by Pildes, Richard H. & Donoghue, Kristen A.
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1995 | Issue 1 Article 10
Cumulative Voting in the United States
Richard H. Pildes
Richard.Pildes@chicagounbound.edu
Kristen A. Donoghue
Kristen.Donoghue@chicagounbound.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pildes, Richard H. and Donoghue, Kristen A. () "Cumulative Voting in the United States," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol.
1995: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1995/iss1/10
Cumulative Voting in the United States
Richard H. Pildest
and Kristen A. Donoghuett
Recent Supreme Court decisions involving North Carolina
and Georgia cast substantial (if ambiguous) doubt on the contin-
ued constitutionality of race-conscious districting.1 For the previ-
ous fifteen years, since the passage of the significant 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 2 race-conscious
districting has emerged as the principal tool for ensuring black
political representation in circumstances in which voting is
polarized along racial lines. Now, however, the Court has de-
clared that strict constitutional scrutiny must be applied whenev-
er race is "the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without
a particular district."3 The precise scope of this enigmatic rule4
will remain uncertain until the Court decides future cases, but
the rule undoubtedly puts the intentional creation of black-
majority election districts on the defensive. If continued pursuit
of minority political representation is going to remain a goal of
public policy, the time to consider alternatives other than race-
conscious districting has arrived.
The most promising alternatives do away not just with race-
conscious districting, but with territorial districting altogether.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
tt J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1995. This paper was presented at the
Annual Meetings of the American Geographers Association (1995) and the American
Political Science Association (1995).
We are grateful to all the people in Chilton County, Alabama who gave so freely of
their time and provided us with all the information that we requested. We also thank
Adam Berinsky for outstanding assistance in performing the statistical analyses reported
in this Article. In addition, we thank the University of Texas Law School for administra-
tive support provided during a visit there. The research reported here was generously
supported by the University of Michigan Cook Fund. For helpful comments, we thank
Samuel Issacharoff, David Lublin, and Robert Richie; for research assistance, Jeff Gitchel.
Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct 2816 (1993); Miller v Johnson, 115 S Ct 2475 (1995).
2 Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 131 (1982), codified at 42 USC § 1973 (1988).
3 Johnson, 115 S Ct at 2488.
For an argument that this rule is unintelligible in theory and unimplementable in
practice, see Richard Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial Redistricting (forthcoming
1996)(on file with Richard Pildes at the University of Michigan Law School).
242 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
Such alternative voting systems include cumulative voting,
limited voting, and preference (or single-transferable) voting.
These alternative voting systems may sound like the exotic mus-
ings of academic theorists,5 but such alternatives to territorial
districts have long been used in other democratic countries.6
Even within the United States, these alternative voting systems
are quietly but increasingly coming into use, primarily at the
local government level.
The purpose of this Article is to provide detailed quantitative
and qualitative information, from one of the longest running
experiments with cumulative voting in the United States, on the
experience of cumulative voting in actual practice. In Chilton
County, Alabama, cumulative voting has been in use since 1988
to elect members of the County's principal political bodies, the
County Commission and the Board of Education. The academic
literature is now filled with abstract arguments about the com-
parative merits and disadvantages of different voting systems,
particularly the choice between territorial districts and alterna-
tive voting systems.7 Rather than continuing this abstract de-
bate, it seems more valuable to assess these theoretical positions
pragmatically, by exploring the actual record of alternative voting
in practice.
We conducted extensive field interviews with governmental,
partisan, and media figures centrally involved in local politics in
Chilton County. In addition, we analyzed available election-
return data since 1988 to determine the extent of racially polar-
ized voting and what differences, if any, the switch to cumulative
' For works in recent years advocating alternative voting systems to remedy viola-
tions of the VRA, see note 52.
' The most thorough studies of voting systems in other democratic countries, with an
emphasis on the contrast between Anglo-American style majority-rule systems and
European proportional-representation systems, can be found in the work of Arend
Liphart. See Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-
Seven Democracies 1945-1990 (Oxford University Press, 1994); Bernard Grofman and
Arend Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (Agathon Press,
1986); Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government
in Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, 1984).
' See, for example, Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 69-
125 (Yale University Press, 2d ed 1971)(comparing proportional representation and non-
proportional representation voting systems generally and identifying thirteen "differential
propositions" and seven "similarity propositions" between the systems). For recent schol-
arly advocacy of alternative voting systems for the United States, which responds to some
of the criticisms of such systems, see Douglas J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: The Case
for Proportional Representation Elections in the United States (Columbia University Press,
1993).
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voting has made. We briefly summarize our findings at the
outset: while not all the predicted benefits of cumulative voting
have occurred in Chilton County thus far, neither have the worst
fears been realized. In general, our study confirms that the es-
sentials of cumulative voting are working out largely as theorists
have predicted ex ante. Cumulative voting turns out not to be
without cultural and political costs, which we identify as precise-
ly as we can. But those costs do not appear substantial. Any
voting system, including the status quo of territorial districting,
has costs as well as advantages; indeed, the VRA itself is a re-
sponse to certain costs of territorial districting. The choice of
voting systems is necessarily pragmatic: on balance, which sys-
tem, best, if nonetheless imperfectly, serves the relevant goals of
American democracy. The data we report here should make for
more informed choices between three of the most important op-
tions currently dominating political practice and public debate:
territorial districts, race-based districting, and alternative voting
systems such as cumulative voting.
I. THREE MEANS TOWARD MINORITY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
We begin with the assumption that in the context of Ameri-
can history and politics, some significant degree of representation
of minorities in American political bodies, particularly blacks,' is
important for any of several reasons. Many people who otherwise
disagree about other aspects of contemporary civil-rights policy
are likely to accept this basic starting point in thinking about
contemporary American democracy. Just as with police depart-
ments and juries, legislative bodies-the quintessential public
institutions-might be considered more legitimate, more effective,
To avoid making already complex linguistic and political problems even more
intractable, this Article is written in terms of the effects of the VRA and cumulative
voting on black voters rather than on minority voters in general. In Chilton County,
blacks are the only relevant minority group, within the terms of the VRA, present in
demographically significant numbers. Hence, this Article focuses exclusively on black vot-
ers. Although blacks were the principal focus of the VRA when originally enacted in 1965,
since 1975 the Act also has been used to protect Asian-Americans, Native Americans,
Alaskan natives, and persons of Spanish heritage. 42 USC §§ 1973(a), 1973b (f)(2) (1988).
One of the defects of current public civil-rights discourse and policy-making is the tenden-
cy to generalize the distinct positions and experiences of different minority groups into a
universal minority experience. Relevant differentiations are important, if often neglected,
to the scope and justifications of different policies. See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff,
Groups and the Right to Vote (forthcoming in Emory Law Journal (1995)). For this reason,
this Article is narrowly focused on black political representation and does not address
issues of minority representation in general except where the text specifically so indicates.
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fairer, or more fully deliberative if they are not completely domi-
nated by one segment of the political community. Similarly, mi-
nority representation might be considered an important means of
promoting a sense of civic inclusion (and hence, perhaps, modera-
tion) among all members of the political community. The reasons
representation might matter would differ among different people,
but the relevance of representation likely elicits considerable
agreement. Our politics and culture have reached the point
where all-white legislative bodies (like all-white police depart-
ments) in the midst of significant racial minorities present real
problems that must be confronted.
Representation here means actual, descriptive representa-
tion, not virtual or other forms of indirect representation: minori-
ties visibly and directly participating as political leaders shaping
public policy on city councils, state legislatures, and the U.S.
Congress. This is a result, not a process-oriented, standard; it
evaluates election systems not only in terms of whether election
processes are "neutral" (whatever meaning neutrality might be
thought to have in this context), but in terms of the results they
produce. The assumption is that, in the context of American
history and politics, no electoral process today is likely to be
considered legitimate, effective, and fair if the outcomes it pro-
duces do not entail some significant degree of actual minority
representation. 9
Three principal means define the current repertoire of ap-
proaches to bringing about minority political representation on
political bodies. We call these (1) the Wishful-Thinking Route; (2)
the Race-Conscious-Districting Route; and (3) the Alternative-
Voting-System Route. The first turns out to rest on empirically
false assumptions about the extent of continuing racially polar-
ized voting. The second has been highly effective in enhancing
minority representation, but many are concerned about whether
this success has come at too high a cost to other values. For those
who consider minority representation an important value, but
view the costs associated with race-conscious districting as too
high, alternative voting systems provide the most feasible alter-
native for the foreseeable future.
This assumption is not necessarily uncontroversial, particularly stated so baldly
and without the necessary qualifications. We do not, however, address the issues underly-
ing this assumption here. The focus of this Article is on the means toward this end, not on
the appropriateness of that end itself.
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A. The Wishful-Thinking Route
An increasingly common perception is that American politics
is becoming racially depolarized enough that the problem of mi-
nority political representation is working itself out. Adherents to
this view reject the claim that self-conscious public measures are
needed to facilitate such representation. Evidence to support this
viewpoint comes from a number of black officials elected in recent
years from majority-white jurisdictions: Douglas Wilder in Vir-
ginia; Carol Moseley-Braun in Illinois; mayors in cities like
Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Durham, New Haven, New York, and
Seattle; Alan Wheat's recent, though failed, bid as the Democrat-
ic nominee for United States Senator from Missouri; and the
recent election of a second black Republican Congressman, J.C.
Watts of Oklahoma, from an overwhelmingly white district. °
Building on these examples, prominent academic commenta-
tors now argue that integrated political bodies will come about
without direct governmental action. Thus, Professor Carol Swain,
a political scientist at Princeton, asserts that "[b]lack politicians
are already elected from districts of widely varying racial compo-
sition"" and that, if federal policies are going to enhance minor-
ity representation, those policies should concentrate on electing
"blacks in districts without black majorities." 2  Abigail
Thernstrom similarly has claimed for nearly a decade that the
"majority-white county, city, or district in which whites vote as a
solid bloc against any minority candidate is now unusual." 3
"0 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics: 1996 1095-
1096 (National Journal, 1995). See generally, The Price of Colorblindness: Facing the
Hard Facts About the Voting Rights Act, Wash Post Cl (Apr 16, 1995).
" Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests 208 (Harvard University Press, 1993).
12 Id at 207. In addition to arguing that safe districts are unnecessary, Swain cri-
tiques the view that black representatives are needed to represent black interests. Yet she
consistently evaluates how well particular representatives serve their communities by
examining the racial distribution of their staffs. Thus, she celebrates black representa-
tives from heterogeneous communities who have racially diverse staffs, for "[s]uch staffs
enable representatives to avoid being perceived as representatives of only their own racial
group. One way they do this is by placing aides from other racial groups in strategic
locations." Id at 213. Swain fails to appreciate the irony in considering it appropriate to
view racially diverse staffs as important to the perception of fair representation from
individual legislators, while rejecting the view that racially diverse legislatures are
important to the perception of fair representation within Congress as a whole. Swain's
book contains many important and provocative observations, but it is riddled with similar
contradictions that leave its general thesis exceptionally unclear. See Randall Kennedy,
Blacks in Congress: Carol Swain's Critique, 2 Reconstruction 34, 37 (1993)("[A]s a scholar-
ly performance, Black Faces, Black Interests is profoundly disappointing.").
13 Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority
Voting Rights 243 (Harvard University Press, 1987).
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These views are echoed in the writings of important public
officials, including Supreme Court Justices. Thus, Justice Antho-
ny Kennedy recently declared that the "assumption that majori-
ty-minority districts elect only minority representatives, or that
majority-white districts elect only white representatives, is false
as an empirical matter."" But these views turn out to rest on
singular and misleading anecdotes, not on a systematic investiga-
tion into patterns of racially polarized voting nationwide. More
reliable and comprehensive social-scientific studies reveal that
racially polarized voting remains pervasive, at least in the South
where it has been studied in most detail. Black officeholding has
risen dramatically, but not as a result of significant declines in
racially polarized voting. Instead, this rise results directly from
obligations the VRA has imposed on recalcitrant jurisdictions to
create majority-black election districts. By and large, it remains
the case that black candidates for public office at all levels, from
city councils to the U.S. Congress, can only be elected from "safe"
majority-black districts. The first means of ensuring direct minor-
ity representation-the assumption that the problem is working
itself out through ordinary politics-turns out to be wishful
thinking.
The detailed empirical evidence in support of this conclusion
is available elsewhere. 5 We only briefly summarize it here. Be-
tween 1964 and 1990, the overall number of black state legis-
lators and congressional representatives in the South rose from 2
to 160.16 But white voters have not recently become more willing
to support black candidates. Indeed, even today, "safe" election
districts-with black voting-age populations above 50 per-
cent-are almost universally necessary in the region for black
candidates to be elected."7 For congressional elections nation-
4 Johnson v De Grandy, 114 S Ct 2647, 2665 (1994)(Kennedy concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). See also Miller v Johnson, 115 S Ct 2475, 2486 (1995),
quoting Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct 2816, 2827 (1993)("When the State assigns voters on the
basis of race, it engages in 'the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a par-
ticular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls.'").
" See Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South:
The Impact of the Voting Rights Act 1965-1990 (Princeton University Press, 1994); Rich-
ard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 Harv L Rev 1359 (1995)(summarizing the empiri-
cal findings of Quiet Revolution in the South).
1" Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second
Reconstruction, in Davidson & Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South at 381 (cited
in note 117). The South is defined as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Davidson & Grofman, eds, Quiet Revo-
lution in the South at 3-4 (cited in note 17).
17 Pildes, 108 Harv L Rev at 1368-69 (summarizing the social-science literature)(cited
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wide, the probability of a white-majority district electing a black
representative was less than 1 percent, regardless of a district's
median family income, its percentage of high school graduates, or
its proportion of residents who were elderly, urban, foreign-born,
or who had been residents of the state for more than five
years.i8 In the 1970s, only 1 percent of all Southern state legis-
lative districts with white majorities elected a black legislator.'
In the 1980s, nothing changed: districts in which blacks were a
minority-no matter how large-continued to elect virtually no
black legislators.20 The majority of Southern states did not elect
a single black state legislator from any majority-white district.2 '
In the average state and local election in Georgia during the
1980s, 86 percent of white voters voted for the white opponent of
a black candidate. 2 In Mississippi, no blacks were elected in
1989 to city councils in districts less than 50 percent black; in-
deed, until the black population reached close to 70 percent in a
district, blacks remained proportionately underrepresented.2"
In South Carolina, a separate study of 130 elections between
1972 and 1985 at the county, state, and congressional levels
revealed the extent of racial polarization.24 In contests where
white and black candidates ran against each other, on average 90
percent of white voters cast their votes for the white candidates,
in note 17).
" David I. Lublin, Gerrymander for Justice? Racial Redistricting and Black and Lati-
no Representation (1994)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
" Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congres-
sional Delegations, in Davidson & Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South at 336, 345
table 11.2 (cited in note 17).
Id at 336, 339, 345.
21 Id at 338.
Laughlin McDonald, Michael B. Binford, and Ken Johnson, Georgia, in Davidson &
Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South at 84-85 (cited in note 17). These numbers
are based on a study of all known judicial, legislative, and at-large county-office elections
since 1980 in counties with substantial black populations in which there was a "serious"
black candidate, defined as one who received at least half the black vote in a primary or
general election. Id.
' Frank R. Parker, David C. Colby, and Mionion KC. Morrison, Mississippi, in
Davidson & Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South at 149 table 5.6 (cited in note
17). In 1989, in Mississippi cities with a population of one thousand or more that had at
least a 10 percent black population according to 1980 census figures, there were 110
districts in which whites were a majority and 85 in which blacks were a majority. No
blacks were elected in the white-majority districts of these cities, while 74 percent of the
black-majority districts elected blacks. Id at 150 table 5.7.
24 James W. Loewen, Racial Bloc Voting and Political Mobilization in South Caroli-
na, 19 Rev of Black Pol Econ 23 (1990).
241]
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while 85 percent of black voters cast their votes for the black
candidates.21 In statistical terms, the racial composition of a pre-
cinct explained 80 percent of its voting patterns.28 This study
further disaggregated the data to examine whether the race of
voters was serving as a proxy for other variables, such as income,
education, or urban residency.27 But race remained "the basic
predictor of outcome" ;2 no other variable had close to the same
significance.29 In a state whose black population is 30 per-
cent,30 such extreme race-based voting means that black candi-
dates would virtually never be elected outside safe minority dis-
tricts. Indeed, in 1989 not a single white-majority district in a
large city of South Carolina was represented by a black city coun-
cil member.3 '
While such microscopically detailed data is only available for
the Southern states that have been the primary focus of the
VRA,32 information from congressional elections suggests that
racially polarized voting continues to be pervasive nationwide.
Thus, from the 1970s through the most recent congressional
elections, only about 1 percent of white-majority congressional
districts have elected black representatives.33 As a result, even
today, significant minority political representation will not come
about through ordinary politics and "traditional" electoral practic-
25 Id at 25.
26 Id.
21 Under current legal standards, racially polarized voting is proven by the pattern of
candidate preferences among white and black voters, without further statistical efforts to
unpack the reasons that might lie behind those preferences. See Thornburg v Gingles, 478
US 30, 52-74 (1986)(opinion of the Court and plurality opinion of Brennan). But see
League of United Latin American Citizens v Clements, 999 F2d 831, 849-863 (5th Cir
1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 878 (1994)(requiring that partisan and racial factors be
distinguished in judicial elections).
2' Loewen, 19 Rev of Black Pol Econ at 28 (cited in note 26).
' Id at table 2.
20 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics: 1994 1146
(National Journal, 1993).
" Orville Vernon Burton, et al, South Carolina, in Davidson & Grofman, eds, Quiet
Revolution in the South at 225 table 7.7 (discussing cities with a total population of over
ten thousand and a black population of at least 10 percent)(cited in note 17). The pattern
was similar, though not quite as stark, for the county councils of South Carolina. In 1989,
in county-council districts in which whites were the majority of the population, and in
which blacks on average were 23 percent of the population, blacks comprised 4.73 percent
of the elected officials. Id at table 7.7A.
22 See Davidson & Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South (providing data on
racially polarized voting in the Southern states that have been the principal focus of VRA
litigation: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia)(cited in note 17).
' Pildes, 108 Harv L Rev at 1374-75 (cited in note 17).
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es: to argue otherwise remains, at least in the near term, wishful
thinking sharply at odds with established fact. Until race plays a
less dominant role in shaping voters' electoral preferences, some
other means will be necessary to realize the end of more than
token minority representation.
B. The Race-Conscious-Districting Route
Since the major, bipartisan amendments to the VRA in
1982,' 4 the principal public-policy tool for ensuring minority rep-
resentation in the face of polarized voting has been the creation
of "safe" minority election districts. Such districts are intentional-
ly designed to make minorities effective voting majorities by
concentrating minority voters into specific districts. This strategy
has been remarkably effective and is the principal reason black
officeholding has risen so dramatically in recent years." Race-
conscious districting has become the central means of enhancing
minority representation.
But as that strategy has been pursued with increasing ag-
gressiveness over the last decade, concerns about its countervail-
ing costs have become more marked. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, usually temperate and restrained, has invoked the
morally laden language of "political apartheid" 6 and political
"balkaniz[ation]"37 to characterize such districts. Similarly, Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas has written that race-conscious districting
is tantamount to the creation of "political homelands" that can
only "deepen racial divisions" with "disastrous implications."38
Justice Kennedy has described race-conscious districting as "carv-
ing electorates into racial blocs."39
Others have raised additional concerns. As Professors Samu-
el Issacharoff and T. Alexander Aleinikoff have observed, safe
districts inevitably must be staffed by what they call "filler peo-
ple."' These are voters who must not be of the relevant minori-
ty group that effectively controls a district (to avoid vote-packing
The Voting Rights Act, Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 131 (1982), codified at 42 USC
§ 1973 (1988).
' For a summary of the evidence that supports this conclusion, see Pildes, 108 Harv
L Rev at 1370-73 (cited in note 17).
' Shaw, 113 S Ct at 2827.
3' Id at 2832.
Holder v Hall, 114 S Ct 2581, 2598, 2599, 2618 (1994)(Thomas concurring).
Johnson, 115 S Ct at 2494.
o T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 588, 631 (1993)(emphasis omitted).
2411 249
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problems), who are not expected to be politically powerful enough
to affect electoral outcomes, but who must be placed in districts
to fill them out for purposes of one-person, one-vote require-
ments. The marginalization and alienation of the inevitable "fill-
er people" must be considered among the costs to weigh against
the benefits of safe districts.
In addition to these and other potential problems, safe
districting is not necessarily fully effective even in enhancing
minority representation. This approach is constrained by geo-
graphic limitations. Territorial-based safe districts can be con-
structed only where minority voters are relatively concentrated
geographically. This constraint has become more salient as the
safe-districting process has reached maturity. The first districts
could be designed around the most geographically concentrated
minorities, such as in urban centers. But as the pressure to cre-
ate more majority-minority districts has increased, redistricters
have had to find more marginal locations to draw such districts.
The result has been the kind of "bizarre" and "highly irregular"
safe minority districts at issue in Shaw v Reno.' Yet the move
toward increasingly contorted district shapes has exacerbated, for
many, the troubling political and social fallout from the safe-
districting approach. It also has created new problems of its own:
the use of more aggressively gerrymandered districts for racial
purposes seems to have legitimated more aggressive gerryman-
dering for many other purposes, particularly self-interested parti-
san ones.
42
In short, the Wishful-Thinking Route remains ineffective
under current sociopolitical conditions. The Race-Conscious-
Districting Route does work, but many complain passionately
about its costs and, in any event, it is an inherently limited strat-
egy.
41 113 S Ct at 2825, 2826.
42 Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich
L Rev 483, 569-575 (1993)(providing quantitative evidence that congressional districts in
the 1990s are significantly less compact than in the 1980s, with particularly dramatic
differences in certain states, such as Georgia, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana, that
created additional minority districts in the 1990s). See also Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v.
Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 Rutgers L J 723, 762-64 (1995Xproviding data on
the much greater splitting of county boundaries and the division of precincts and cities in
1990s congressional redistricting compared to 1980s redistricting in North Carolina,
Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia).
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C. The Alternative-Voting-System Route
The third means of ensuring significant minority representa-
tion is to replace traditional election districts and the voting
rules that accompany them with alternative voting rules. For
purposes of VRA policies, the most promising of these alterna-
tives are limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting
(or single-transferable voting) systems. All three are forms of
semiproportional representation that stand midway between the
more direct forms of proportional representation common in
many European countries and the Anglo-American alternative of
single-member districts.
These alternative voting systems abandon districting in favor
of the election of several candidates running at large throughout
the relevant jurisdiction. By also modifying winner-take-all vot-
ing rules, these systems enable minority groups of voters with
intense political preferences for particular candidates to control
some number of seats. The rationale for replacing winner-take-all
voting rules with alternative voting systems is the same as that
which led Congress first in 1842 to replace at-large elections with
the territorial districting system and to reestablish that require-
ment in 1967.' At-large congressional elections, in which all
' Nothing in the Constitution itself requires the states to create congressional dis-
tricts. See US Const, Art I, § 2. Indeed, in the first elections after ratification, the majori-
ty of new states held at-large congressional elections. Only Massachusetts, New York,
Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina were organized into representative districts.
There is evidence that at least some of the Framers expected the states to create districts
and intended the Time, Place, and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitu-
tion to act as a brake against factional districting by state legislatures. Andrew Hacker,
Congressional Districting: The Issue of Equal Representation 8-10 (Brookings Institution,
1963). For example, James Madison approvingly asserted in the Federalist Number 56:
"Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts and it will be found that there will be
no peculiar local interests ... which will not be within the knowledge of the representa-
tive of the district." Federalist 56 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers
346, 347 (Mentor, 1961). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton stated at the New York ratifying
convention: "The natural and proper mode of holding elections will be to divide the state
into districts in proportion to the number to be elected.'" Alexander Hamilton, Address at
the New York Ratifying Convention, quoted in Carolyn Goldinger, ed, Jigsaw Politics:
Shaping the House After the 1990 Census 6 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990).
As of 1840, nine of the thirty-one states continued to elect representatives at large.
In response to the frequent occurrence of a majority party's sweeping an entire state del-
egation in at-large states, Congress invoked the Time, Place, and Manner Clause of
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution to pass the Reapportionment Act of 1842 ("Reap-
portionment Act"). The Reapportionment Act required, for the first time, that representa-
tives "shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the
number of Representatives" for each state. Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch 47, § 2, 5 Stat
491. Despite the Reapportionment Act, New Hampshire, Georgia, Mississippi, and Mis-
souri conducted their 1842 elections under at-large systems. Over protests, Congress
241]
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candidates run on a statewide basis, enable the same statewide
majority to control all seats. Thus, a party with only 51 percent
of statewide voting support could win all seats in a state's con-
gressional delegation, which regularly occurred in those states
with at-large elections." This system came to be viewed as giv-
ing majorities too much power to dominate politics at the expense
of various minority interests.' Recognizing the importance of
seated all the members of these states. Goldinger, ed, Jigsaw Politics at 18.
In 1901, Congress added a compactness requirement to the Reapportionment Act.
Reapportionment Act of 1901, ch 93, § 3, 31 Stat 733, 734. In 1929, Congress enacted a
combined census-reapportionment bill that established a permanent method for apportion-
ing House seats after each Census. Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch 28, § 22, 46 Stat 21,
26-27, codified at 2 USC § 2a (1988). See generally, Steve Bickerstafl, Reapportionment by
State Legislatures: A Guide for the 1980's, 34 Sw L J 607, 610-611 (1980)(describing
Congress's failure to pass a reapportionment act after the 1920 census, thus delaying
reapportionment until passage of the Reapportionment Act of 1929). This legislation
contained no statement of whether previous requirements, such as districting, compact-
ness, or contiguity, continued to apply. Three years later, the Supreme Court held that
these requirements from earlier legislation had lapsed with the passage of the Reappor-
tionment Act of 1929. See Wood v Broom, 287 US 1 (1932). See also Franklin v Massachu-
setts, 112 S Ct 2767, 2771 (1992)(discussing the passage of the Reapportionment Act of
1929). Not until 1967 did Congress enact legislation once again requiring that states elect
House members from single-member districts. Act of December 14, 1967, Pub L No 90-
196, 81 Stat 581, codified at 2 USC § 2c (1988). During the interim period, from 1929-
1967, several states, including some large ones, did elect at least some of their delegation
at large. Interestingly, a primary motivation for the 1967 legislation reinstituting the
requirement of single-member districts was the VRA of 1965: Congress feared Southern
states might resort to multimember congressional districts to dilute minority (that is,
black) voting power.
Today, only the seven states entitled to a single representative-Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming-hold at-large congressio-
nal elections. For a good overview of congressional reapportionment acts, see Emanuel
Celler, Congressional Apportionment-Past, Present, and Future, 17 L & Contemp Probs
268 (1952).
" For the data on the partisan distribution of congressmen depending on whether
states used at-large or districted elections from 1789-1842, see Rosemarie Zagarri, The
Politics of Size 154-57 appendix 3 (Cornell University Press, 1987)(showing that delega-
tions in at-large states were nearly always one-party delegations throughout this period,
while districted states had multiparty congressional delegations).
For example, when New Jersey shifted from at-large to districted congressional
elections, one New Jersey legislator noted that '[t]his method was adopted.., to coun-
teract.., the numerous population of those capitals and thus not to swallow up the agri-
cultural by the mercantile interest.'' Id at 111, quoting State Gazette and New-Jersey Ad-
vertiser (Mar 13, 1798). Even proponents of at-large elections recognized that larger
states would be comprised of such diverse interests that districted elections might be
more appropriate there: "'some states, from their great extent, or unequal figure, from
their being divided by distinct interests, or great natural boundaries, might derive a plau-
sible apology for the institution [of districts].'" Id, quoting William Pitt Beers, Address to
the Legislature and People of the State of Connecticut (1791). Some states, such as
Pennsylvania, initially adopted at-large elections, only to abandon them almost immedi-
ately after the first congressional elections because the system allowed small majorities to
dominate important minority interests. In the first congressional elections, all eight of
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ensuring some degree of representation for significantly sized
minorities-which at the time might be geographic, economic, or
ideological minorities-Congress required in 1842 that states
create districts for congressional elections. 46 Although the con-
cept of alternative voting systems had not been developed at that
time, the principles on which it rests are the same as those be-
hind the move away from at-large elections to districts: represen-
tative bodies ought to be broadly representative of the political
community as a whole, rather than of the interests of only a bloc-
voting majority.
Limited voting works by giving voters fewer votes to cast
than the total number of seats at issue. Thus, if five seats on a
city council are to be filled, voters throughout the city might each
be permitted to cast only two votes. The effect of limiting each
voter to two votes is to prevent the same majority from dominat-
ing each and every seat. Well-organized minority groups that are
sufficiently large are thereby enabled to control the outcome of at
least one seat.47
Pennsylvania's congressmen were Federalists who lived in the eastern part of the state.
As one commentator wrote, "'I am sure that Pennsylvania will never again suffer eight
representatives to be elected out of a mere corner of the state.' Id at 113, quoting Carlisle
Gazette (Apr 28, 1790). In 1791, the Pennsylvania Assembly passed a law dividing the
state into eight districts. Zagarri, The Politics of Size at 113 (cited in note 46).
Reapportionment Act of 1842 § 2, 5 Stat at 491. By the time of the Act, nine states
still used at-large elections. See note 45. The largest was Georgia, which was entitled to
eight representatives, with a total population of 691,392, and a population entitled to rep-
resentation of 579,014. United States Department of State, 3 Sixth Census of the United
States: 1840 368-69 (Norman Ross Publishing, Inc., 1990). Between 1816 and 1826,
twenty-two resolutions were introduced in Congress proposing a constitutional amend-
ment to require districted elections. Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States During the First Century of Its History, 2 Annual Report
of the Am Hist Assoc 57 (1896).
" The concept of "threshold of exclusion" describes the minimum size a minority
group must reach under various voting rules to have effective control over at least one
seat. Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferrable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for
Minority Vote Dilution, 27 USF L Rev 781, 785-86 (1993). In limited voting, the formula
for calculating the threshold of exclusion is V/(V+N) 1, where V is the number of votes a
voter may cast and N is the number of seats to be filled. Id at 786. Thus, with two votes
to cast in a five-member election, the threshold would be 2/(2+5)+1, so that any group that
is 28 percent or more of the voting pool could, in principle, effectively control the outcome
with respect to at least one seat. The threshold of exclusion formula assumes complete co-
hesiveness within the minority group: the formula assumes that each member of the
relevant minority casts all of its votes for the "minority-preferred" candidate. Id at 787.
The formula also assumes that the majority is completely united in its opposition to the
minority-preferred candidate; in practice, majorities are rarely so united and the more
crossover support a minority-preferred candidate receives, the smaller the support needed
from the minority community to ensure election. Id.
241]
254 THE UNIVERSI7Y OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
Cumulative voting rests on a similar principle but employs a
different technique. Voters receive as many votes to cast as there
are seats to fill; voters then may distribute these multiple votes
among candidates in any way they prefer. Thus, voters may
"plump" all their votes on one candidate-the strategy of choice
for minority groups with intense preferences for a particular
candidate-or give one vote each to several candidates. If five
seats on a city council are to be filled, voters would have five
votes each to distribute as they saw fit. Again, the pure
majoritarianism of traditional single-member districts is con-
strained because the same majority cannot dominate the election
for all five city-council seats. If the voters in a sufficiently large
minority group concentrate all their votes on the same candidate,
they can assure that candidate's election regardless of how other
voters, including a majority of voters, cast their ballots. Even
with extensive racially polarized voting, for example, a cohesive
minority group that constituted at least one-sixth of the elector-
ate would be able through cumulative voting to control one of the
five city-council seats.'
Preference voting is a bit more complicated. The mechanics
of voting itself are straightforward, if generally unfamiliar in
American electoral politics: voters cast one ballot but rank order
their preferences for candidates on that ballot. If five candidates
are running, each voter ranks them from one to five.49 These
rankings then allow votes that would be "wasted" on one candi-
date to be transferred to another candidate. Votes are wasted
either when they are surplus-that is, cast for a candidate who
would win without them--or when they are useless-that is, cast
for a losing candidate who could not win with them. Preference
voting systems transfer these "wasted" votes to the next ranked
candidate on a voter's ballot."0
" The formula for the threshold of exclusion under cumulative voting is 1/(1+N)+ 1,
where N is the number of seats to be filled. Engstrom, USF L Rev at 786 (cited in note
49). Thus, with five seats at stake and five votes to cast, a minority that casts one vote
more than 1(1+5), or one vote more than one-sixth of the total vote can control the out-
come of one seat. Id at 787. Again, this assumes that the minority group votes perfectly
cohesively: all members cast all five of their votes for the same minority-preferred candi-
date. Id.
9 Voters need not rank order all candidates if they prefer not to.
For a detailed recent discussion of the mechanics of preference voting and the
reasons it is preferred to cumulative voting, see Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the
Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 Colum L Rev 418, 435-441 (1995). The process by
which votes are counted and transferred is difficult to explain. This is a serious drawback
in a democratic society where voting rules should be transparent and readily understood.
The threshold for election under preference voting is V/(N+1)+ 1, where V is the total
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This vote-transferring process increases the proportion of
voters who vote for a winning candidate. It thereby enables elec-
toral minorities to control some seats in a multimember race
even in the face of concerted majority opposition. In a race for a
five-seat city council with a preference voting system, a candidate
with just above one-sixth of the total vote will win a seat. A mi-
nority voting bloc of that size is thus sufficient to ensure election
of one representative of its choice.
All three alternative voting systems thus fragment the power
of electoral majorities in order to facilitate minority representa-
tion. For racial minorities, the immediate effect of these systems
is similar to that of race-conscious districting within a traditional
territorial districting system. Either of these two routes-race-
conscious districting or alternative voting systems-enable racial
minorities to exercise effective electoral control over some seats
even in the face of a hostile, racially polarized majority elector-
ate. But because the two routes employ such different means
toward the same end, the secondary consequences vary dramati-
cally.
For those critical of race-conscious districting, alternative
voting systems offer several theoretical advantages. They do not
"balkanize" the electorate along racial lines. The state does not
draw election-district lines on the basis of race, nor does it con-
centrate voters into specific "safe" districts based on their race.
The state does not ascribe political identities to voters by group-
ing them with other voters deemed to have common political
interests. Indeed, the state does not directly single out any par-
ticular minorities for special protection through concentration
into "safe" districts.
Alternative voting systems enable individual voters to
choose, in each and every election, how they want to define their
number of votes and N is the number of seats to be filled. Id at 436 n 62. For votes that
are wasted because they were cast for losing candidates, the transfer process is straight-
forward. If no candidate crosses the election threshold in the first round of counting, the
last-place candidate is dropped and his or her votes redistributed to the second preference
of the voters who had voted for the losing candidate as a first preference. Id. With five
seats to be filled and ten thousand voters, for example, 1,667 votes would be required for
a candidate to be elected. Id. If no candidate received that many votes in the first round of
counting the ballots, the last-place candidate would be dropped.
Surplus votes would be those any candidate received above 1,667. The process of
transferring surplus votes is more complex. Given current technology, the best method for
redistributing surplus votes is probably to distribute a winning candidate's surplus votes
according to the percentage of second-choice preferences registered on the winning
candidate's ballots. Briffault, 95 Colum L Rev at 436 n 62.
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political identities. If a black voter strongly prefers a particular
black candidate in a given election, she can concentrate her vote
on that candidate. But if other issues are more salient in the
next election-a candidate's position on schools, for example-a
voter can cast her vote based on that issue.
In contrast to alternative voting systems, race-conscious
districting in essence defines race as the dominant dimension of
electoral politics-and it locks in this judgment for a decade until
further redistricting occurs. Alternative voting systems enable
voters to regroup themselves in whatever way they choose at
each election. These alternatives also do not single out particular
groups for special protection; they enable any sufficiently large
and cohesive minority voting group-whether racial, ethnic, polit-
ical, or other-to have effective control over some seats. In addi-
tion, because new district lines need not be redrawn every de-
cade, alternative voting systems offer the side benefit of reducing
opportunities for political gerrymandering.51 Some advocates
also argue that such systems, by fragmenting majority rule and
giving minorities more opportunities to influence electoral out-
comes, will lead to more competitive elections and help increase
the notoriously low rates of voter turnout in American elec-
tions.52
To be sure, alternative voting systems might create problems
of their own, certainly in theory and perhaps in practice. One
familiar concern is that enabling the representation of many
minority viewpoints will produce indecisive, even paralyzed,
legislative bodies.5" Another concern is that such systems might
"1 For a summary of the potential advantages of cumulative voting in particular, see
Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative
Democracy 99-101 (The Free Press, 1994); Richard H. Pildes, Gimme Five, New Republic
16 (Mar 1, 1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv CR-CL L Rev 173 (1989);
Briffault, 95 Colum L Rev 418 (cited in note 52).
52 See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Quest for Political Equality, 77 Va L Rev
1413, 1471 (1991) ([Ifncumbents will find it necessary to mobilize voter interest and par-
ticipation in an election, a task that will require incumbents to develop substantive pro-
grams and proposals.").
'3 See Maurice Duverger, Which is the Best Electoral System, in Arend Lijphart and
Bernard Grofman, eds, Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives 31, 36
(Praeger, 1984X"In order to form stable and strong governments, capable of making
decisions.., plurality [voting] is the best method."); Enid Lakeman and James D. Lam-
bert, Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems 154
(Faber and Faber, 1959)("The wish to limit the number of parties to two is connected with
the belief that government can be carried on effectively only by a single party. One party,
it is said, must have unhampered power for the time being to carry out its programme.").
241] CUMULATIVE VOTING
facilitate the representation of extremist or marginal political
groups. Indeed, by giving representatives of such groups a public
platform and public role, the legitimacy of such groups might
even be enhanced." Less familiar, but potentially troubling, is
the possibility that alternative voting systems might increase
campaign costs because candidates running at large must com-
pete in an entire jurisdiction, not just a small district. Lastly, at-
large representatives might undermine a valuable sense of con-
nection voters have to their representatives in individual dis-
tricts.55 These are the principal concerns about alternative vot-
ing systems that critics have raised.
D. Evaluating Different Voting Systems
The choice between alternative voting systems and territorial
districts with winner-take-all voting might be approached in at
least four different ways. One method is theoretical analysis of
the predicted effects of territorial districting with winner-take-
all-rules versus alternative voting systems. In the political sci-
ence literature, numerous commentators have explored the theo-
retical advantages and disadvantages of different electoral sys-
tems.56 This literature has not received much attention in legal
See, for example, Ferdinand A. Hermens, Representation and Proportional Repre-
sentation, in Lijphart & Grofman, eds, Choosing an Electoral System at 15, 21 (quoting a
newspaper article urging repeal of alternative voting systems for making it too easy to
elect fringe-party candidates)(cited in note 55); Enid Lakeman, The Case for Proportional
Representation, in Lijphart & Grofman, eds, Choosing an Electoral System at 41, 46-47
("Opponents of proportional representation believe it will [mean]... that a large party
cannot govern without [ ] dependence on support from a small one.")(cited in note 55).
' For a discussion of the connection between representatives and voters in individual
districts, see generally, Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v Johnson,
1995 U Chi Legal F 23, 40-43.
8 See Jack F.H. Wright, Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-
Preferential Systems, in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws and
Their Political Consequences 124, 136 (Agathon Press, 1986)("Without exception, quota-
preferential [single-transferable vote] systems in Australia have given substantially
higher proportions of voters the representation they wanted than have the single-member-
district systems.")(cited in note 8); Arend Lijphart, Rafael L. Pintor, and Yasvnori Sone,
The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and
Spanish Examples, in Grofman & Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws at 154, 163 (discussing
strategic handicaps for large parties and advantages for small parties that limited voting
and single nontransferable voting create, noting that "surprising[ly] ... the ... elections
do not yield very proportional results," but concluding that these, systems provide more
proportional representation than a plurality voting systemXcited in note 8); Arend
Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies
1945-1990 40 (Oxford University Press, 1994)("The more limited the number of votes each
voter has, and the larger the number of seats at stake, the more LV tends to deviate from
plurality and the more it resembles [proportional representation].")(cited in note 8);
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scholarship, however, which has only recently begun to explore
the different voting practices democracies might choose.
Historical analysis is a second method for assessing different
voting systems. We might explore the ideas and values that moti-
vated the original American choice for a system of territorial
districts with winner-take-all rules.57 Such an inquiry could re-
cover the original values thought to be served by territorial dis-
tricts. Although little work of this sort has been done to date, it
seems clear that alternative voting systems did not begin to be'
understood until Thomas Hare's pioneering work in the mid-
nineteenth century.58 As a result, no deliberative choice between
territorial districts and alternative voting systems was made
when the American commitment to the former was established.
United States Senator Charles Buckalew of Pennsylvania, at
first a leading proponent of districting, became the leading advo-
cate of cumulative voting and proportional representation by the
1860s. In a speech in Philadelphia in 1867, he described why he
would have supported cumulative voting, rather than single-
member districts, had the former system been known at the time
he campaigned successfully to replace at-large elections with
single-member districts:
I drew the amendment to the Constitution of our State
by which your city is broken into districts. [ ] What was
the idea of that amendment?... The idea was to break
up the political community, and allow the different
political interests which compose it, by choosing in
single districts, to be represented in the Legislature of
the State. Unfortunately, when that arrangement was
made for your city (and for Pittsburgh also, to which it
will soon apply), this just, equal, almost perfect system
Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 69-125 (Yale University
Press, 2d ed 1971)(comparing proportional representation and non-proportional represen-
tation voting systems generally and highlighting thirteen "differential propositions" and
seven "similarity propositions" between the systems)(cited in note 9).
See note 45.
See Thomas Hare, A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and
Municipal (Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 3d ed 1865); John Stuart Mill,
Considerations on Representative Government (Hnery Regnery Co., 1962)(originally
published in 1861). In America, an obscure paper presented by Thomas Gilpin to the
American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia in 1844, around the time Congress first
required districting, recognized that districting would not protect minority voters as well
as Gilpin's proposal for a form of proportional representation. Jennifer Hart, Proportional
Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System 1820-1945 13-14 (Clarendon Press,
1992). Gilpin's work went unnoticed in America for twenty years. Id at 14 n 12.
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of voting [cumulative voting], which I have spoken of to-
night, was unknown; it had not then been announced
abroad or considered here, and we did what best we
could. 9
At the least, this kind of historical analysis can deflate any
sense that districting with winner-take-all voting rules reflected
a deliberate choice to reject alternative voting systems. ° Beyond
that, such analysis might reveal that the aims thought best
served in 1789 or 1842 by traditional electoral structures are
better served today by more sophisticated structures not con-
ceived of or widely understood then.6'
A third method for evaluating the choice among voting sys-
tems is a comparative one. In a study of all lower-house elections
conducted since 1945 in twenty-seven democracies, including the
twenty-four most durable democracies, only 17 percent used the
Anglo-American system of districting and majority rule.62 The
rest of the countries used proportional representation systems,
ranging from those considered to have stable governments, such
as Germany, to those that do not, such as Italy.6" The American
institutionalization of democracy-territorial districts and majori-
ty rule-is no more "natural" a form of democracy than these
other systems, and indeed, stands out as an exception. Compara-
tive study of these systems and the Anglo-American one therefore
should provide fertile ground for testing more abstract arguments
about the merits of the alternatives.
In this Article, we pursue a fourth approach for assessing
alternative voting systems. Unbeknownst to many, in recent
years there has been a quiet proliferation of alternative voting
systems in the United States. In nearly all contexts, these sys-
59 Charles R. Buckalew, Proportional Representation 62-63 (John Campbell & Son,
1872).
' In her extensive study of congressional debates on election rules from 1789-1842,
Rosemarie Zagarri reports that "[mlost legislators saw the problem as a choice between
two alternatives: at-large or district elections." Zagarri, The Politics of Size at 105 (cited in
note 46).
"l Professor Samuel Issacharoff has employed historical analysis of Supreme Court
voting-rights jurisprudence to argue that the central values the Court has identified in
these cases are better served by alternative voting systems than the current territorial
districting system. Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member
Districts, 1995 U Chi Legal F 205.
'2 Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems at 2, 48 (cited in note 8); Arend
Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One
Countries (Yale University Press, 1984)(cited in note 8).
' Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems at 21-46 (cited in note 6).
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tems have emerged as voluntary settlements between plaintiffs
and local governments in the course of litigation to enforce the
VRA. Settlements along these terms have been taking place for a
number of years now. As a result, one no longer needs to turn to
foreign countries, with different cultural features, to explore
alternative voting systems in practice. Nor is it necessary to rely
on theoretical speculation about the potential consequences of
such systems. Given the relative prevalence of such systems for a
significant period of time, we can now learn a good deal about
their actual operation from empirical analysis of experience to
date in the United States. That empirical approach is the one we
pursue here.
II. A CASE STUDY OF CUMULATIVE VOTING: CHILTON COUNTY,
ALABAMA
In 1988, in the aftermath of a statewide class-action VRA
lawsuit that challenged the use of at-large election schemes for
county commissions and school boards throughout Alabama,
several local governments entered into consent decrees in which
they agreed to try innovative alternative voting systems. The
federal district court had found that the at-large electoral struc-
tures, combined with pervasive racially polarized voting through-
out the state, had led to substantive VRA Section 2 violations. In
most places, the court ordered the standard remedy of "safe"
majority-minority districts to resolve these violations. But in
some places that remedy was unavailing because minority voters
were too geographically dispersed to be concentrated into the
appropriate number of election districts. Indeed, in some places,
minority voters were so dispersed as to make it impossible (with-
out resort to extremely contorted districts, and at times not even
then) to create even a single district with a black voting majority.
Chilton County, a rural county in the center of the state, was
one such place. After lengthy discussions, the plaintiffs and local
political officials agreed to adopt a cumulative voting system.
Starting in 1988, Chilton County has elected its two principal
political bodies, the County Commission and the Board of Educa-
tion, through cumulative voting. The County Commission con-
trols an annual budget of approximately $9 million." For nearly
a decade now, through two elections for the County Commission
" Interview with Julius Kelley, Chilton County Commissioner 1 (Jan 5, 1994)(on file
with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
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and the Board of Education, Chilton County has had as much
experience with cumulative voting as any American jurisdiction
in recent years.65 The Chilton County experience is particularly
noteworthy because voters there have had seven votes to distrib-
ute among candidates in any way they see fit, as compared to a
more manageable three votes in jurisdictions that others have
studied.66
We spent several days in Chilton County interviewing local
elected officials, party leaders, civic leaders, and journalists to
assess how the abstract arguments about cumulative voting are
playing out in practice. In addition, we gathered and statistically
analyzed election data on a precinct-by-precinct level. In this
part, we report the results of these qualitative and quantitative
investigations.
A. The Process Leading to Cumulative Voting
1. Background on Chilton County.
Chilton County consists of 694 square miles in the geograph-
ic center of Alabama. 7 It includes four incorporated towns:
Clanton, which is the county seat, Thorsby, Jemison, and
Maplesville. s Each town has a mayor-council form of govern-
ment.69 The schools are run by a single Board of Education, and
the County itself is governed by the Chilton County Commis-
sion. °
The self-proclaimed "Peach Capital of the World," " Chilton
County is a predominantly rural county that maintains a multi-
million dollar peach industry. The county also has an emerging
manufacturing industry, with plants that produce metal moldings
The first adoption of cumulative voting this century was in 1987 in Alamogordo,
New Mexico. Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert A. Taebel, and Richard L. Cole, Cumulative
Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J
L & Pol 469 (1989).
" Richard L. Engstom, Jason F. Kirksey, and Edward Still, One Person, Seven Votes:
The Cumulative Voting Experience in Chilton County, Alabama, in Anthony Peacock, ed,
Affirmative Action and Representation (forthcoming 1996)(on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum).
7 United States Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1994: A Statisti-
cal Abstract Supplement 18 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 12th ed 1994).
" National Geographic Atlas of the World 25-26 (National Geographic Society, 6th ed
1992).
Welcome to Clanton Map (Southern Engineering, 1991).
70 See Ala Code § 16-8-1 (1975)(creating county boards of education); Ala Code § 11-3-
1 (1975)(creating county commissions).
71 Welcome to Clanton Map (cited in note 71).
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for automobiles, timber products, foundry products, furniture,
printing presses, and baskets.72 In the 1990 census, 23.6 percent
of Chilton County's population was classified as urban and 76.4
percent as rural.73 Chilton County's median household income
was $21,627 in 1989, as compared to Alabama's average of
$23,597, and the national median income of $30,056.14 87.7 per-
cent of Chilton County's residents were born in Alabama.75 Of
those twenty-five years and older, 56.6 percent had a high-school
education or higher, while only 7.5 percent had a bachelor's de-
gree or higher.76
As of the 1990 Census, Chilton County had 32,458 residents,
of whom 3,658 (11.3 percent) were-black. 77 The black community
is extremely dispersed throughout the County, although a few
pockets of modestly concentrated black populations do exist.78
The percentage of black residents in Chilton County is declining,
due to an inflow of whites from rapidly growing surrounding
counties.79 Less than a one hour drive on 1-65 from both Bir-
72 Peach farming is now Chilton County's fourth largest industry. Id. The 1990 census
listed "[o]perators, fabricators, and laborers" as Chilton County's most common occupa-
tions, followed by "[tiechnical, sales, and administrative support occupations" and
"[p]recision production, craft, and repair occupations." United States Bureau of the Cen-
sus, 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics: Alabama 247 (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1993).
"' United States Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing,
Population and Housing Unit Counts: Alabama 5 (U.S. Government Printing Office,
1993).
14 Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1994 at 23 (cited in note 69).
7' Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Character-
istics: Alabama at 1 (cited in note 74).
76 Id.
77 Id at 13. At the time the settlement was approved, the district court noted that
Chilton County was 11.86 percent black. Dillard v Chilton County Board of Education,
699 F Supp 870, 872 (M D Ala 1988).
78 Dillard v Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F Supp at 876.
7' According to United States Census data, the percentage of black residents in
Chilton County fell from 13.5 percent in 1970, to 11.9 percent in 1980, to 11.3 percent in
1990. See United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics
of the Population: Alabama 2-107 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); United
States Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, General Population Charac-
teristics: Alabama 2-11 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982); Bureau of the Census,
1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics: Alabama at 13 (cited in
note 74). The percentage decline in the black population of Chilton County coincided with
growth in the overall population of neighboring counties. For example, Shelby County,
which borders Chilton County to the north, grew 261 percent from 1970 to 1990. Bureau
of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population: Alabama at
2-108; Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Charac-
teristics: Alabama at 18 (cited in note 74). The majority of Shelby County's growth was in
its number of white residents. Between 1970 and 1990, Shelby County's population of
white residents increased by 59,132 while its population of black residents only increased
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mingham and Montgomery, the county is attracting increasing
numbers of predominantly white suburbanites.
2. The litigation backdrop.
Chilton County adopted cumulative voting to settle a voting-
rights complaint that arose out of Dillard v Crenshaw County,"0
a class-action suit brought by Alabama's oldest statewide black
political group, the Alabama Democratic Conference ("ADC").
Dillard v Crenshaw County challenged the at-large election sys-
tems used by many cities, counties, and county school boards in
Alabama. The district court found that the Alabama legislature
had intentionally discriminated against black voters when it
designed and authorized at-large election schemes for local juris-
dictions."1 The court identified intentional discrimination in the
"anti-single-shot" laws passed in the 1950s, the "numbered-place"
laws passed in 1961, and in the legislature's century-long pattern
of switching between local at-large systems and districted sys-
tems in a way that minimized black voting strength. 2 Chilton
by 1,193. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Popula-
tion: Alabama at 2-108; Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, Social and
Economic Characteristics: Alabama at 18 (cited in note 74).
o 640 F Supp 1347 (M D Ala 1986). See also Dillard v Crenshaw County, 649 F Supp
289 (M D Ala 1986), afld in part and remanded in part, 831 F2d 246 (11th Cir 1987),
reafl'd on remand, 679 F Supp 1546 (M D Ala 1988).
" Dillard v Crenshaw County, 640 F Supp at 1356-61. See Ala Code §§ 11-3-1, 11-3-
11 (1975)(creating county commissions and endowing them with enumerated powers,
including authority over county property, taxation power, and authority to appropriate
funds for sewer improvement); Ala Code § 16-8-1 (1975)(creating county boards of edu-
cation); Ala Code § 16-13-62 (1975)(mandating the use of local tax dollars to fund schools).
8 Dillard v Crenshaw County, 640 F Supp at 1356-61. Single-shot voting is used, for
example, in at-large elections involving multiple candidates. Single-shot voting permits
voters to concentrate more than one vote on a preferred candidate. Laws banning single-
shot voting generally require each voter to cast votes for as many candidates as there are
positions. See City of Rome v United States, 446 US 156, 184 n 19 (1979). Single-shot
voting enables minorities to concentrate their votes on preferred candidates and, as in
cumulative voting systems, is a way that minorities can break through a dominant, bloc-
voting, and hostile majority. Anti-single-shot voting laws can thus be a means of ensuring
continuing majority control. In Dillard v Crenshaw County, 640 F Supp at 1357, the court
found that Alabama had adopted anti-single-shot voting laws in the 1950s in response to
judicial invalidation of the state's white primary system, and that the laws had been
intentionally adopted because, in the words of their sponsor, "there are some who fear
that the colored voters might be able to elect one of their own race to the ... city council
by 'single shot' voting." Id.
Numbered-place laws, also used in at-large elections with multiple candidates,
require that candidates run for specific, numbered places. Such laws are also potential
means for perfecting majority control; the same jurisdiction-wide majority can control
each and every seat when candidates must compete directly for specific seats. The Dillard
v Crenshaw County court found that Alabama's numbered-place laws, which came into
being in 1961 to replace the anti-single-shot voting laws, had been adopted because, in the
264 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
County was not a named defendant in the original complaint, but
in the wake of the court's finding of liability, the plaintiffs added
additional defendants, including Chilton County. In the end,
Chilton County was one of 183 cities, counties, and county school
boards whose election systems were challenged in Dillard v
Baldwin County Board of Education.83
3. Chilton County's at-large electoral system.
The pre-Dillard v Baldwin County Board of Education elec-
toral systems for the Chilton County Commission and Board of
Education were typical of the systems challenged in the lawsuit.
Both were five-member bodies elected at large. Each had repre-
sentatives from all regions of the County due to candidate resi-
dency requirements.8 The County was divided into "numbered
posts"--each candidate had to qualify for a specific number and
place. Voters throughout the county voted for all seats, but each
voter could vote for only one candidate in each place. To be nomi-
nated by a political party, a candidate had to win a majority of
votes in the primary. If no candidate received a majority, a runoff
was held."5 The probate judge, also elected through an at-large
election, served as Chairperson of the County Commission.
4. The Chilton County settlement.
The political leaders of Chilton County were surprised at
being added as defendants in Dillard v Baldwin County Board of
Education."6 Several noted that Chilton County had black politi-
cal officials in the past, including a member of the city councils of
both Clanton and Jemison.s7 Some asserted a "lack of interest"
words of one legislative sponsor, "[i]t has occurred to a great many people, including the
legislature of Alabama, that to protect the white people of Alabama, [ ] there should be
numbered place laws." Id.
' 686 F Supp 1459 (M D Ala 1988). By 1987, the Dillard litigation had resulted in
more than 280 new minority districts in Alabama, and in the state having the highest
national success rate in electing blacks to office. Jim Yardley, 1 Voter, 7 Votes? County
Boosts Minority Clout, Atl J and Const G5 (Oct 23, 1992).
' The Board of Education had five regions. The County Commission only had four
regions since the Probate Judge served as the fifth member.
Dillard v Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F Supp at 872. The majority-vote
requirement did not apply to the general elections. Id.
' Interview with John Hollis Jackson, Attorney for the County Commission and the
Board of Education of Chilton County 1 (Jan 4, 1995)(on file with the University of Chica-
go Legal Forum).
87 Id at 1; Interview with Mike Kelley, Publisher of the Clanton Advertiser 3 (Jan 4,
1995)(on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum). Eddie Reed, now a member of
the County School Board, was a city councilman in Jemison. The black councilman in
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defense:"8 the absence of black representatives on bodies like the
County Commission and the Board of Education was said to be
due to a lack of black candidates. 9 Yet despite expressing un-
certainty about the County's liability, County leaders also were
interested in settlement. By their accounts, this interest stemmed
from litigation costs and, perhaps more importantly, litigation
uncertainty." Consistently, the County's lawyer and elected offi-
cials expressed fears over possible court-imposed remedies were
the County held liable.91
Eventually, the County stipulated to findings that voting was
racially polarized9 2 and to substantive liability.9" On the same
day, it filed a proposed settlement agreement that had been
reached with the plaintiffs. Conceiving the terms of settlement,
however, had proven difficult. The County had been willing to
convert to a districted system and to draw a majority-minority
district. But, unless the County Commission and Board of Edu-
cation were increased to at least fifteen members each (an option
Clanton was Ron Simms. According to Jerome Gray of the ADC, Simms had run at large
for the City Council three times, losing each time, and eventually was appointed. The City
Council seats were then districted, and he was the representative of a majority-black
district. Interview with Jerome Gray 12 (Jan 4, 1995)(on file with the University of Chica-
go Legal Forum).
" For a critique and study of the lack-of-interest defense in gender cases under Title
VII, see Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empir-
ical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation,
59 U Chi L Rev 1073 (1992); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work:
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv L Rev 1749 (1990).
' Interview with Mike Kelley at 6-7 ("[The lack of black representation is] not
because they didn't get elected because they were black. It may [be] because they didn't
run until this system came up.")(cited in note 89); Interview with Jackson at 1 ("We just
never thought of it as a problem because they hadn't run for office here, County-wide...
.")(cited in note 88).
'o One member of the Board of Education who voted for the cumulative voting pro-
posal said that the Board was told that challenging the lawsuit might cost up to $250,000
because the case might go to the United States Supreme Court. See Interview with O.J.
McGriff, Chairperson of the Chilton County School Board 1 (Jan 4, 1995)(on file with the
University of Chicago Legal Forum). As he put it, "[s]chool dollars would have to have
been spent. So there was a unanimous vote to go along with the cumulative voting settle-
ment." Id.
91 See Interview with Jackson at 6 ("We were concerned about what it was going to
cost, because we felt that we definitely would have to at least go to the 11th Circuit with
it and there would be fines.")(cited in note 88). See also id at 3 ("We never knew what
they would have ordered but we knew that they would be given some relief. I mean we
knew that. And we didn't know what that would be and we felt that this was probably the
most acceptable of all."); Interview with McGriff at 1 (discussing the County's uncertainty
about what relief a court might award to the plaintiff class)(cited in note 92).
Dillard v Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F Supp at 874.
13 Id at 871.
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the County leaders viewed as unwieldy and unduly expensive),
the geographic dispersion of black voters in the County made the
drawing of a contiguous, relatively compact majority-black dis-
trict impossible.94
In settlement discussions, a private attorney assisting in the
settlement process for Dillard v Baldwin County Board of Educa-
tion proposed moving to an alternative voting system.95 Alterna-
tive voting systems are increasingly common at the local level in
Alabama, in part because the leading statewide black political
organization understood the concept early and has been a consis-
tent supporter of it. Between twenty and twenty-three jurisdic-
tions in Alabama use limited voting, primarily for municipal
elections; indeed, Alabama is the national leader in the use of
limited voting.9"
Chilton County, however, decided instead to opt for cumula-
tive voting. After a "long, long series of discussions" of both cu-
mulative voting and limited voting, the lawyer representing
Chilton County, John Hollis Jackson, concluded that cumulative
voting would be preferable.97 Those negotiating the settlement
for the County feared that limited voting would be perceived as
interfering with principles of equality and fair voting because
voters would not be permitted to cast a vote for all the seats
being filled. Indeed, when the ADC proposed limited voting, the
leading local paper editorialized that "being allowed to vote for
only one candidate borders on forbidding residents to have the
Constitutionally given right to elect those who govern."" In opt-
" See Interview with Mike Kelley at 1 ("I saw a district drawn one time that started
in the Northern part of the county, up at the county line.., it's just unbelievable, like a
river running catching like this and back over here and back down there ... . [E]ven the
ADC thought it was a farce because it would have taken votes from every community in
the county to make up that district.")(cited in note 89); Interview with Jackson at 1 (cited
in note 88).
' The suggestion apparently came from David Boyd, a lawyer in Montgomery who
was acting as an unofficial liaison between the parties in the massive Dillard litigation to
attempt to settle as many of the cases as possible. Interview with Jackson at 1 (cited in
note 88). Boyd first suggested cumulative voting in an answer to a request to identify re-
medial options. Interview with David Boyd 1 (Sept 9, 1995)(on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum). He recalls having gotten the idea from reading the academic
literature and also from his involvement in previous litigation in which Pam Karlan and
Ed Still had raised the possibility. Id. Boyd does not view himself as an advocate for
cumulative voting, but as someone who was fulfilling his responsibility to present the
range of remedial options. Id.
"6 See Gerald L. Ingalls and Theodore Arrington, The Use of Limited Voting in the
United States: Potential and Practice (unpublished draft manuscript on file with the Uni-
versity of Chicago Legal Forum).
97 Interview with Jackson at 1 (cited in note 88).
" Plan Should Be Rewritten, Independent Advertiser 4A (Nov 18, 1987). The editorial
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ing for cumulative voting, Chilton County became the only Ala-
bama jurisdiction to do so.99 The motivating force for the deci-
sion to accept an alternative voting system was, without a doubt,
the fear of what the federal court might impose instead.'00
Once Jackson agreed to consider a cumulative-voting remedy,
he had to persuade the County's political officials to accept it.
Initially, they were incredulous. As Jackson put it, they "acted
like I was insane to even bring it to them."1°1 Jackson held sev-
eral meetings with the existing County Commission and Board of
Education in which various options, including pursuing the litiga-
tion, were discussed. As he put it, one day there would be agree-
ment to accept the cumulative voting solution, the next day, the
political leaders would be "totally opposed." 2 Eventually, both
bodies became persuaded that, as alien as the idea of cumulative
voting had seemed initially, it was the best option.0 3 After for-
mally voting to adopt the cumulative voting scheme, the two
bodies held a joint press conference to begin the process of per-
suading the County's citizens to accept it. Once the political lead-
ers endorsed cumulative voting as the best alternative under the
circumstances, they remained committed to their decision; thus,
went on to state:
The popular vote has served this county well. The fact that the two largest [1
communities in the county have elected black members to their councils points
out clearly that people here do believe in everyone being represented by govern-
ment. But using the federal court to ... "assure" victories for their candidates
tramples on the freedoms of everyone. If Chilton County was a South American
country ruled by dictators we wouldn't be so shocked by the ADC plan. But this
is still the United States ... isn't it?
Id.
, Interview with Gray at 4 (cited in note 89). Cumulative voting is much more
common in Texas. Ingalls & Arrington, The Use of Limited Voting in the United States
(cited in note 98). In Texas, at least twenty-six small cities and school districts now use
cumulative voting; only one Texas jurisdiction uses limited voting. Robert Brischetto,
Cumulative Voting at Work in Texas: A 1995 Exit Survey of Sixteen Communities, in
Voting and Democracy Report: 1995 61, 62 (The Center for Voting and Democracy, 1995).
Cumulative voting was introduced first in 1991 in settlement of voting-rights litigation
challenging the Lockhart Independent School District. Id at 62. Preliminary studies of
these Texas elections reach results similar to ours: cumulative voting in Texas appears to
be working largely as predicted, without significant or unexpected disadvantages. Id at
62-65.
"' See note 93.
101 Interview with Jackson at 6 (cited in note 88).
102 Id.
'0o Id at 6-7.
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steadfastness played a considerable role in the eventual, begrudg-
ing public acceptance of cumulative voting. The parties drafted a
formal settlement agreement and the district court approved it,
over the objection of some members of the plaintiff class.'"°
5. Selling cumulative voting to the citizens of Chilton
County.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Chilton County
experience was the self-conscious way public efforts were made to
explain and justify the new system. Cumulative voting was not
simply accepted by the County's lawyers in litigation, nor merely
formally adopted by the relevant political bodies. Instead, the
political leadership, as well as the editor of the major newspaper,
made a concerted effort to explain how the new system would
work and the reasons for its adoption. Putting aside earlier resis-
tance, the leadership adopted a pragmatic attitude and assumed
responsibility for making the new system work.
Details of the settlement negotiations had been reported in
the local press,0 5 and the publisher of the Independent Advertis-
er, Mike Kelley, had written a hostile editorial against the other
alternative voting system under consideration, limited voting.' °6
Kelley also thought cumulative voting was "the silliest thing [he
had] ever heard of. It can't be constitutional .... ."'0' But Kelley
was persuaded by Jackson and others-"cooler heads" in his
words-that cumulative voting was the best alternative the
County had.0 8
The official announcement of the settlement came at a news
conference led by Jackson in February of 1988, with the first
cumulative voting elections to take place in that summer's prima-
ries. Thus, there was little time to prepare for the new system.
Both the County Commission and Board of Education, which had
been five-member bodies with residency requirements, would
become seven-member bodies, elected at large with no residency
requirements. The move from five to seven members was neces-
104 Dillard v Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F Supp at 876. The six objectors among
the plaintiff class presented a five single-member district plan which included one district
where most black citizens would live. Id. The court held that this plan failed to satisfy
one-person, one-vote requirements because the district in which the majority of blacks
would live was twice the population of an ideal district. Id.
105 See []DC Wants 1 Man-7 Votes, Independent Advertiser 1 (Jan 29, 1988); Mike
Kelley, Boards Reach ADC Pact, Independent Advertiser 1 (Feb 5, 1988).
106 See note 100.
107 Interview with Mike Kelley at 1 (cited in note 89).
106 Id.
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sary for the cumulative voting system to work as intended. The
"threshold of exclusion" mathematically defines the smallest,
cohesive minority group that can control one seat under different
voting systems even if the majority (1) is uniformly hostile to the
minority's preferences and (2) distributes its own votes cohesively
-enough to maximize the majority's effort to defeat minority-sup-
ported candidates."° In a traditional majority-rule winner-take-
all system, a minimum of 51 percent of the vote is needed. In a
cumulative voting system with five seats at stake and each voter
having five votes, the threshold is 16.6 percent."0 With a black
population of around 11.8 percent,"' a five-member body would
not ensure Chilton County's black population of control over even
one seat in the face of extreme racially polarized voting. With a
seven-member board, a cohesive minority just above 12.5 percent
would effectively control one seat. Even a small amount of white
crossover voting, thus, would ensure that Chilton County's black
population would be able to elect at least one candidate of its
choice to a seven-member board chosen through cumulative vot-
ing. Moreover, these theoretical thresholds are calculated on the
assumption that the hostile majority distributes its votes opti-
mally among the right number of white candidates; any deviation
of the majority from perfectly cohesive voting of this sort lowers
the practical election threshold for minority-supported candi-
dates.
In the news conference explaining the new system, the
County's attorney, John Hollis Jackson, told voters, "I can confi-
dently say that not one single member of either board like[d]
what he had to do."" The same issue of the Independent Adver-
tiser that reported the press conference included an editorial
entitled "Making the Best of a Bad Situation," indicating that the
paper had switched positions and was now reconciled to cumula-
tive voting." While saying that the federal court order would
"anger many residents," and that "[wie are angry too," the edito-
rial also said that cumulative voting was "the better of the evils"
and that it was "time to make the best of a bad situation. Learn
the new system and exercise your right to vote."" 4
See note 49.
11 See note 50.
.. See note 79.
12 Mike Kelley, Boards Approve Vote Plan, Independent Advertiser 1 (Feb 10, 1988).
112 Making the Best of a Bad Situation, Independent Advertiser 4 (Feb 10, 1988).
114 Id.
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The cumulative voting system apparently was met with con-
tempt and disbelief by the general public. Sue Smith, a Republi-
can elected to the Board of Education in 1988, remembered:
When the idea was first proposed, as far as the public
reaction, we thought it was a joke, because the idea
that one person could vote seven times in one particular
race was just really unheard of at that time, and many
people thought it was just something that they were
grasping at straws kind of a thing, and it would not
ever come into effect here. Once it became the law un-
der the settlement of this court case, a lot of people still
didn't believe it.115
Nor was this skepticism confined to whites. Bobby Agee, Chilton
County's first black County Commissioner, who was elected un-
der cumulative voting, recalled that "I didn't see how it would
work .... Everybody kept saying it would work, but in the back
of my mind I just could not figure out with the white population
being as large as it is and the minority population being as small
as it is, I kept thinking 'we're still going to lose no matter
what['] ... ,,.1 As the summer primaries approached, the edu-
cational efforts of both local government officials and other, more
partisan forces, accelerated.
6. Organized educational efforts.
The relevant political bodies, the County Commission and
Board of Education, decided to run government-funded advertise-
ments in both local papers explaining how cumulative voting
would work. These advertisements featured sample ballots before
the primary and general elections in 1988. In addition, many of
the key figures in the adoption of cumulative voting took it upon
themselves personally to explain the new system to the public.
Jackson spoke at local clubs and met with candidates from both
parties." 7 The probate judge, who supervises elections, made
"' Interview with Sue Smith, Former member of the Board of Education and former
Chairperson of the Chilton County Republican Party 1 (Jan 6, 1995)(on file with the
University of Chicago Legal Forum).
16 Interview with Bobby Agee, Chilton County Commissioner 13-14 (Jan 4, 1995)(on
file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
17 Interview with Jackson at 12 (cited in note 88).
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similar appearances. Members of the County Commission and
Board of Education spread word of the system to friends and
neighbors. Jackson recalled that "a lot of people worked hard on
it even though they didn't believe in it.""'
Political parties and organizations also engaged in education-
al campaigns. An unusual historical feature of Alabama's black
political history has played a significant role in the state's pio-
neering position in the use of alternative voting systems and, it
seems likely, in the apparent success of cumulative voting in
Chilton County. In the early 1960s, before blacks were registered
to vote in significant numbers, an effective statewide black politi-
cal organization, the ADC, had already formed."' The ADC has
been a plaintiff in many of the state's major voting-rights suits,
including Dillard v Baldwin County Board of Education, and has
been a leading proponent of alternative voting systems. A stan-
dard concern with alternative voting systems, particularly cumu-
lative voting, is that they require more sophisticated voting strat-
egies, especially from the minority voters such systems poten-
tially benefit. With an extensive grassroots network throughout
Alabama and considerable experience in mobilizing minority
voters, the ADC has a great deal of self-confidence in its ability
to educate minority voters at the local level about the intricacies
of alternative voting systems. In addition to the ADC, a second
statewide black political organization, the New South Coalition
("NSC"), has spun off from the ADC as a more moderate alterna-
tive and now regularly fields candidates.
Before the 1988 elections, both the ADC and the NSC dis-
tributed sample ballots that instructed their constituents how to
cast their ballots. Typically, these ballots urged voters to vote
seven times for the minority candidate the organization endorsed
and marked out how to do so (we have included copies of these
sample partisan ballots, from the first cumulative voting election,
in Appendix A).2 ° The ADC held meetings to explain how cu-
mulative voting worked and had representatives present at many
ballot boxes to aid voters who requested assistance.' 2' In addi-
tion, the two traditional parties in the County, Democrats and
"' Id at 13.
Interview with Gray (cited in note 89).
"o See Interview with Agee at 15 (cited in note 118).
121 Interview with Gray at 15-16 (cited in note 89).
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Republicans, also distributed sample ballots. Unlike the ADC
ballots, however, these ballots, at least in 1988, did not take
advantage of the cumulative voting feature and instead asked
voters to give one vote to each of the party's seven candidates.
B. Results to Date under the Cumulative Voting System
In this Section, we describe the actual results along several
different dimensions of Chilton County's seven-year experience
with cumulative voting.
1. Effects on minority representation: descriptive
representation.
The primary aim of adopting cumulative voting, in the con-
text of the VRA, is to ensure minority communities effective
opportunities to elect candidates of their choice despite a hostile,
racially polarized bloc-voting majority. The first and most impor-
tant test of cumulative voting, then, is whether it succeeds in
this essential respect. Questions about the efficacy of cumulative
voting rest partly on fears that the system requires sophisticated
and cohesive voting strategies from minority communities, which
in turn require high levels of knowledge and concerted group ac-
tion. The alternative of "safe" districts does not require a compa-
rable level of voting sophistication. One concern, then, about
cumulative voting is that it will not be as effective as black-ma-
jority districts in ensuring the election of candidates that the
minority community prefers (typically, black candidates).
a. Black representation.
In fact, cumulative voting has worked just as predicted ex
ante with respect to enhancing black representation even in the
face of racially polarized voting. In elections for the powerful
County Commission in 1988, the first held under cumulative
voting, Bobby Agee became the first black representative to be
elected to the Chilton County Commission since Reconstruc-
tion. 2 Indeed Agee, the only black candidate in the general
election, not only was elected, but received more total votes than
any other candidate in the fourteen-candidate field.'2 3
122 David Van Biema, One Person, Seven Votes, Time 42 (Apr 25, 1994).
123 Another black candidate, Robert Binion, had run in the Democratic primary, but
had been defeated.
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Statistical analysis of the 1988 election reveals that Agee
was not the leading vote getter due to cross-racial support. In-
stead, black voters effectively used the cumulative voting system
to concentrate their support for Agee despite almost no white
crossover support.2 4 Only 1.5 percent of white voters appear to
have cast even a single vote for Agee, while virtually all black
voters voted for him.'25 More importantly, most black voters
gave Agee multiple votes, including many who cast all seven
votes for Agee. One means of testing this is by examining the
number of precincts in which various candidates received more
votes ("bonus votes") than the number of actual voters. Agee
received bonus votes in more precincts than any other candidate,
indicating that voters were casting more multiple votes for him
than for other candidates.'26
These results also are consistent with the campaign tactics
in the 1988 elections. Agee immediately grasped the significance
of the cumulative voting system and actively campaigned for
seven votes from each voter.'27 His advertisements also asked
for all seven votes. In the first election under the new system,
this was considered a novel and aggressive move. Several people
characterized it as a "bold" strategy,12 s and many people
thought it was "not [the] Southern Gentleman [thing to do]." 29
Most other candidates campaigned in the traditional way, asking
for only one vote.
Agee and another black candidate, Robert Binion, both en-
tered the Democratic primary again in 1992, and this time both
minority candidates survived. No black Republican candidates
ran in the Republican primary. i0 Agee again was elected to the
County Commission, placing second in the field of fourteen, while
Binion was defeated.
31
124 The analysis of the 1988 results is taken from Edward Still, Cumulative Voting
and Limited Voting in Alabama, in Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds, United
States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities 183 (Greenwood Press,
1992).
121 Id at 194.
126 Id at 190.
127 Interview with Agee at 7 (cited in note 118).
128 Interview with Bobby Agee, Chilton County Commissioner 1 (Aug 31, 1995)(on file
with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
1 Interview with Mike Kelley at 2 (cited in note 89).
120 Interview with Agee at 1 (cited in note 130).
131 After the 1988 election, the County Commission selected Agee to serve as Chair-
person of the Commission. Agee declined to serve as Chairperson for the first six months
of his term, choosing to wait until he had more experience as a commissioner. But Agee
accepted the position the second time it was offered, and has served as Chairperson ever
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With respect to the Board of Education, one black member
has now been elected in each of the two elections utilizing cumu-
lative voting.13 In 1988, James Hill, a Democrat, was the only
black candidate in the general election and placed second. Voting
was again extremely polarized along racial lines: estimates are
that 1.13 percent of white voters cast a vote for Hill, while nearly
all black voters voted for him. 3 Hill apparently received multi-
ple votes from most black voters, thereby enabling his election. In
1994, Hill again ran in the general election, along with another
black candidate, Edward Reed. This time, Reed won a seat, plac-
ing third, and Hill, despite being an incumbent, lost.
b. Representation of other minorities.
Advocates of cumulative voting assert that, in contrast to
race-conscious districting, which enhances the electoral opportu-
nities only of racial minorities, cumulative voting-as a neutral
means of enhancing minority representation more general-
ly-ought to enhance minority representation of other groups as
well. Cumulative voting has indeed had this effect in Chilton
County.
Republicans
Republicans were dramatically underrepresented on the
County Commission prior to the 1988 election.1 4 In 1988, how-
ever, Republicans won three of the seven commission seats. This
sudden transformation occurred before the dramatic shift toward
the Republican party at the local level in the South. Sue Smith,
then Chairperson of the Chilton County Republican Party, be-
lieves that cumulative voting contributed to the Republican
breakdown of the Democratic monopoly on local political pow-
er.135 In 1992, Republicans again were successful, this time win-
ning two seats on the County Commission.
since. Interview with Jackson at 5 (cited in note 88). See also notes 165-169 and accompa-
nying text.
132 No blacks had ever served on the Board of Education prior to cumulative voting.
Interview with Agee at 1 (cited in note 130).
13 Still, Cumulative Voting and Limited Voting in Alabama, in Rule & Zimmerman,
eds, United States Electoral Systems at 195 (cited in note 126).
" According to Bobby Agee, there has never been a majority of Republicans on the
County Commission. As a matter of fact, he does not recall there ever being more than
one Republican on the Commission at any one time. Interview with Agee at 1 (cited in
note 130).
" Interview with Smith at 3 (cited in note 117).
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Republicans have enjoyed similar success in the Board of
Education elections. Only one Republican was on the Board of
Education prior to cumulative voting.13 In 1988, however, three
Republicans (including two women) were elected, and in 1994,
two Republicans were elected.'37 While more complex statistical
work would be required to explain with certainty the causes
behind the sudden representation of Republican minorities on
these bodies, it seems clear that cumulative voting is a signifi-
cant factor.
Women
Advocates sometimes assert that alternative voting systems
will increase the number of women in office. Indeed, a greater
percentage of officeholders are women in countries with alterna-
tive voting systems compared to those with single-member terri-
torial districts.' The theory is that women must run head-to-
head with men in winner-take-all single-member district elec-
tions, and in those circumstances, more voters are likely to vote
for a man because of gender.'39 Alternative voting systems do
not pit candidates directly against each other in the same way;
voters must vote for a candidate as opposed to voting against
one.
In Chilton County, women have been elected to the Board of
Education since cumulative voting began. Only one woman was
on the Board before 1988," but in the cumulative voting elec-
" Interview with Sue Smith, Former member of the Board of Education and former
Chairperson of the Chilton County Republican Party 1 (Sept 20, 1995)(on file with the
University of Chicago Legal Forum).
'37 Id.
138 Wilma Rule and Pippa Norris, Anglo and Minority Women's Underrepresentation in
Congress: Is the Electoral System the Culprit?, in Rule & Zimmerman, eds, United States
Electoral Systems at 41, 44 (cited in note 126). Between 1970 and 1991, in sixteen West-
ern democracies (including Europe, Scandinavia, North America, Israel, and New Zea-
land), countries with proportional representation systems averaged 14.7 percent women in
parliament, while countries with single-member districts averaged 5.8 percent women in parlia-
ment. Douglas J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representa-
tion Elections in the United States 102 (Columbia University Press, 1993)(cited in note 9).
"39 In the United States, a recent study has concluded that the low level of women in
the United States Congress (11 percent in the House, 7 percent in the Senate) is due to
the small number of women candidates and to the power of incumbency. When women do
run, they fare as well as men when incumbency is taken into account. See Jody Newman,
Women Candidates Can Win... When They Run: Perception and Reality, in Voting and
Democracy Report: 1995 at 139-140 (cited in note 101). This study, of course, does not
compare how well women would do under alternative voting systems compared to single-
member districts.
"4 Interview with Smith at 1 (cited in note 138).
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tion that year, two women, both Republicans, were elected. A
third woman, a Democrat, was nearly elected but placed eighth,
one position away from a seat."" One of the successful women
candidates in the 1988 election commented that she was not sure
cumulative voting had played a role in the sudden success of
women candidates. She did, however, note that more women
were running because more women had decided that they could
get elected-which might be associated with the use of cumula-
tive voting.4 2 Still, women have not been successful in County
Commission elections, even since cumulative voting began. The
one woman who has run in a primary or general election for the
County Commission was defeated."
In sum, since cumulative voting began, groups that previous-
ly had not been represented-blacks, Republicans, and wom-
en-have been elected in significant numbers to both the County
Commission and the Board of Education. With respect to blacks,
statistical analysis of the first cumulative voting elections, as
well as the analysis of more recent elections that follows in sec-
tion II. B. 5., demonstrates that cumulative voting is directly
responsible for this change. Given the sequence of events, it
seems likely that cumulative voting also played a significant role
in the election of women and Republicans that began in 1988, but
more sophisticated analysis would have to be undertaken to dis-
tinguish the various potential causes of the sudden electoral suc-
cesses of these groups.'"
Two Republican women ran for election in 1994, Anne Glasscock and Sandra
Moone. Glasscock won but Moone lost. Id.
.42 Interview with Smith at 3 (commenting that she was "not sure that [the success of
women candidates is] a result of cumulative voting. It might be in some respects, but
more women have been running.... I think it's just [that] women have decided that they
can get elected.... I think another reason that women have been elected, and Republi-
cans and minorities to the School Board, is because it's expanded [from] five members to
seven members, so more people were going to be elected.")(cited in note 117).
" The candidate was Sandra Gilliand in 1988. Interview with Agee at 1 (cited in note
130). A woman was appointed to the County Commission in 1991 after a commissioner
died, but she did not seek reelection at the end of her term. Id.
" A related but independent question is whether cumulative voting affects not just
the electability of candidates, but the willingness of different types of candidates to run,
given their greater likelihood of success under a cumulative voting system. We asked sev-
eral recent less traditional winners whether their decision to run had been influenced by
the existence of the cumulative voting system, but none reported that it had been. See, for
example, Interview with Smith at 2 (cited in note 117).
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2. Effects on minority representation: substantive
representation.
Descriptive representation-the actual presence of minorities
in political office-is the immediate test of alternative voting
systems. Descriptive representation might in and of itself bring
about several desirable results: among other effects, it might
enhance the legitimacy of political bodies within the community
as a whole and foster a greater sense of civic inclusion among
political minorities. But a major question is whether more minor-
ities in office translates into substantive representation that is
more responsive to the minority community. Previous scholarship
concludes that verifiable, material changes in local government
policy do occur when racial minorities begin to assume public of-
fice." Nonetheless, some continue to question the link between
descriptive and substantive representation: whether the in-
creased presence of black public officials translates into tangible
policy and other benefits for minority voters. Is minority repre-
sentation of primarily symbolic importance? Do white officials
represent the actual substantive interests of black constituents
just as effectively? Indeed, white members of the Chilton County
Commission questioned whether there was any need for minority
representation on the County's various administrative bodies.'
'" The two most detailed studies to date involve several cities in California and Flori-
da. The first, a study of the ten most populous cities with the largest black and Hispanic
populations in northern California, found that minority incorporation in city government
(for which minority representation was considered a prerequisite) directly led to policies
and programs that benefitted minorities. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and
David H. Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality
in Urban Politics 140, 168 (University of California Press, 1984). This study also reported
that "minority councilmembers were important in linking minorities to city hall, in
providing role models, and in sensitizing white colleagues to minority concerns." Id at 141.
The second, a comprehensive study of six communities in different parts of Florida be-
tween the late 1950s and the mid-1980s, reached similar conclusions. See James W.
Button, Blacks and Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern
Communities 15-26, 226-229 (Princeton University Press, 1989). According to this study,
"[b]lack representation 'on the inside'... gave [black citizens] easy, constant, and rela-
tively quick access to the decision-making arena and to white leaders, both public and
private." Id at 226. Furthermore, "[iun the struggle for improvements in municipal servic-
es, black officials were the single most important political factor. This was true for most
capital and labor-intensive services." Id at 227. Black officeholders "also proved instru-
mental in having blacks appointed to citizen advisory boards and committees." Id at 228.
See, generally, Milton D. Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the Distribution of
Public Benefits, in Chandler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 271, 281-84 (Howard
University Press, 1984). For a survey of several studies on these questions, see Chandler
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Bernard Grofman and Chandler
Davidson, eds, Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 7, 49
n 139 (The Brookings Institution, 1992).
" Interview with Agee at 1-2 ("I've heard the statement from several of the commis-
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In Chilton County, we found at least three significant chang-
es in local government-two policy oriented and one attitudi-
nal-in the wake of the cumulative voting system and the first
election of a black County Commissioner. 14 7 First, the most sig-
nificant function of the County Commission is to make road-pav-
ing decisions. Of the various functions within the Commission's
jurisdiction, none occupies more time or matters more to the
residents of Chilton County than petitions to have roads
paved.'" The County still has about six hundred miles of un-
paved roads, which become muddy in the frequent rains, but
financial resources sufficient to pave only eight miles per
year.1
4 9
Before Agee was elected, the County Commission granted
road-paving petitions in an ad hoc and informal way. At Agee's
urging, the Commission adopted a more formal point system with
neutral criteria that eliminated the potential for favoritism. The
point system depends on the number of houses on a road,
whether the mail carrier travels it, if there is a church present,
and the like. According to Agee, he was motivated by several
problems in the old system and not solely by the aim of ensuring
that road-paving services were distributed more equitably in the
black community. But one consequence of adopting general, neu-
tral criteria is that more roads now are being paved where black
residents live than were under the system that existed before
Agee was elected. 5°
Second, Agee's presence has led to the appointment of more
minorities to important administrative boards. One of the
sioners when we were trying to get this done, they would say[,] well all of them would
whine, [']we can represent your people just as well as a minority,['] but... I made the
statement to them that you know, that may very well be so, but there [are] some things
that they can't even imagine[,] you know, being one color. . . .")(cited in note 118).
"' We did not undertake any inquiries into substantive changes in educational
policies adopted by the Board of Education in the wake of minority representation.
" Interview with Agee at 3 (cited in note 118); Interview with Trey Hughes, Reporter
for the Independent Advertiser 2 (Jan 4, 1995)(on file with the University of Chicago Legal
Forum)("This county has more than 600 miles of unpaved roads. Very poor county, and
they're going to feel that way until every one of them is paved. If you would go to a
commission meeting, .. "every week citizens show up complaining about the roads and
the conditions.. ").
"' Interview with Agee at 3-4 (cited in note 118).
Id at 3. Interestingly, the white attorney for the County Commission and Board of
Education, John Hollis Jackson, noted that he couldn't "see a big difference" in the road-
paving practices of the County Commission and added "I don't know that they [the
minority community] were deprived before." Interview with Jackson at 10 (cited in note
88).
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Commission's principal tasks is appointing, by majority vote,
these administrative officials.'51 Agee thus cannot appoint any-
one directly, but as he says, "the mere fact of me being there and
recommending a minority goes a long way."" 2 These adminis-
trative boards wield considerable power because they operate
independently of the County Commission.53 Agee has succeed-
ed in appointing a minority to the Hospital Board and the Water
Board, both of which previously had not had minority members.
The struggle over the Water Board was particularly notewor-
thy and was commented on by several of our interviewees. The
Board, a three-member body, controls millions of dollars a year
for spending on matters such as extension of water services to
new areas.'5 ' When a position opened on the Water Board,
which a local reporter described as "a pretty big position,"15
Agee pressed to fill it with a minority. The County Commission
stalemated in a "bitter, bitter fight""56 for five months, with var-
ious members pushing for their own candidates. Eventually, Agee
prevailed. The controversy was resolved only recently, and there
is some disagreement about whether any concrete changes in
Water Board policies resulting from this appointment can be
identified.'57 But several people reported that the minority com-
munity felt better with someone on the Board,'58 and Agee is
confident that the black community will receive fairer treatment
in the provision of water services.'59
The third benefit observers attributed to Agee's presence was
more intangible. Many people, including Agee himself, said that
black residents in Chilton County "definitely" took a lot of pride
in Agee's presence and felt more connected to local government
as a result."6 As the County's attorney put it, "I do think that
... Interview with Agee at 16 (cited in note 118).
152 Id at 1.
'5 Id at 16.
Many residents currently use wells to supply their water needs. Id at 16-17.
Interview with Hughes at 4 (cited in note 150).
156 Id.
157 John Hollis Jackson asserted that a water system extension recently had been
placed in a community with a large minority population, but neither the local reporter we
spoke with nor Mr. Agee similarly asserted that any significant new developments had
taken place. See Interview with Jackson at 10-11 (cited in note 88); Interview with
Hughes at 4 (cited in note 150); Interview with Agee at 16-17 (cited in note 118).
" Interview with Agee at 1 (cited in note 118); Interview with Hughes at 4, 11-12
(cited in note 150).
... Interview with Agee at 1-2, 16-17 (cited in note 118).
16 Interview with Jackson at 11 (cited in note 88). See also Interview with McGriff at
2 ("With a black commissioner, the black community feels more involved.")(cited in note
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the black community is really proud of having elected [black]
officials. I think that makes a difference."" 1 As the reporter
who covers local politics put it, black residents like the cumula-
tive voting system "because it works, and for the longest time
they had no voice in government and now they do ....
One of the more dramatic long-term consequences of the
emergence of black representation on the County Commission, in
the wake of cumulative voting, is that Bobby Agee eventually
became Chairperson of the Commission. The Chairperson nor-
mally is elected by the other commissioners."An unusual
clause in the litigation settlement, however, had entitled Agee to
serve as Chairperson. The settlement provided that black officials
elected to the County Commission or Board of Education could
serve as Chairperson for eight months anytime they chose to do
so during their initial term in office.'6 Agee, however, did not
feel prepared to assume the duties of Chairperson during his first
term and did not want to invoke this special clause if unneces-
sary.16
5
92).
161 Interview with Jackson at 16 (cited in note 88). Jackson added:
Naturally when a problem comes up to the County Commission, if you have a
black man sitting there as an elected member, a black woman, whatever, they're
going to understand a problem from a racial perspective that a white man or a
white woman who doesn't have any experience, they just won't be able to recog-
ize it, so it makes a difference, it really makes a difference.
Id. See also Interview with Agee at 5-6 ("Quite naturally I'm the minority representative
on that board. Quite naturally I'm going to look out for the best interest of... everybody,
but I'm going to make sure that the minority interest [is] very well tak[en] care of on that
board. And I'm sure the various people from the various areas that they live in feel the
same way.")(cited in note 118).
162 Interview with Hughes at 5 (cited in note 150).
1 Interview with Agee at 2 (cited in note 118).
164 Id.
1 The clause presumably had been included in response to the experience of some
other jurisdictions where blacks who were elected due to VRA litigation faced recalcitrant
white elected officials who refused to accept black elected officials on equal terms. The
most visible example is described in Presley v Etowah County Comm, 502 US 491 (1992),
in which county commissioners, elected at large before VRA litigation, each had the power
to grant road contracts independently-a significant source of power and patronage-in
their own areas of the county. After the courts forced the county to move to a single-
member district plan, the four incumbent commissioners voted to give themselves joint,
exclusive authority over roads and to confine two newly elected commissioners (one of
whom was black) to overseeing courthouse maintenance and engineering. The Supreme
Court held that such changes in the internal distribution of power among elected officials
did not require preclearance under Section 5 of the VRA. Id at 510. For other examples of
sudden shifts in internal operating rules after black officials are elected, see Susan
Feeney and Steve McGonigle, Minority Officials Say Powers Denied Under Racist Tactics,
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After being in office for one full term, Agee had established
enough credibility and expertise that the other commissioners
elected him Chairperson for one year and then reelected him for
a second year.' We found no evidence that the other commis-
sioners were motivated by the specter of Agee invoking his right
to serve as Chairperson under the settlement agreement. In any
event, even if that motivation played a role in Agee's initial elec-
tion (in the sense that the settlement was understood to entitle
him to serve as Chairperson once), it could not have played any
role in his reelection. Instead, the commissioners we interviewed
regularly remarked on Agee's judgment, temperament, and abili-
ty as the reasons they voted him Chairperson of the Commission.
As one put it, "Agee is the most intelligent and most educated
man on the commission. 
167
Agee's elevation to Chairperson of the most powerful local
government political body in Chilton County illustrates the inte-
grative role cumulative voting can play. Given racially polarized
voting patterns, Agee could not have come close to being elected
in an at-large election, even after he had served his first term.
Yet given the opportunity to serve that cumulative voting creat-
ed, he earned sufficient respect from his fellow commissioners to
be elected Chairperson twice.
In his role as Chairperson, Agee's influence undoubtedly will
expand. The Chairperson is automatically a member of several
other boards, including the Industrial Development Board and
the Senior Citizens Board, and serves as a liaison between those
boards and the County Commission. These additional roles will
enhance the range of issues on which Agee can pursue the sub-
stantive interests of Chilton County's minority residents, while
serving the community as a whole. Based on our investigations,
there seems little doubt that the presence of a black elected offi-
cial on the County Commission as a result of cumulative voting
is already producing tangible substantive benefits, as well as
intangible feelings of civic inclusion, for the black residents of
Chilton County.
Dal Morn News 1A (Aug 14, 1994).
16 Interview with Agee at 2 (cited in note 118).
16 Interview with Julius Kelley at 2 (cited in note 66).
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3. Public satisfaction with cumulative voting?
One of the striking discoveries we made was that cumulative
voting was widely disliked in Chilton County. Virtually everyone
we interviewed reported this fact.18 Even more interesting
were the reasons for this dislike. The principal reason was the
widely shared view that cumulative voting was undemocratic and
unconstitutional because it violated the one person, one vote princi-
ple.169 As one observer put it, "they feel it violates their sense of
governmental propriety somehow. They keep saying it's unconsti-
tutional, 'I just know it's unconstitutional.' I hear that all the
time."7' Indeed, one person reportedly refused to cast more
than one of his seven votes "because the system is unconstitu-
tional.""' Some attributed this view to the uniqueness of the
system: "[I]t goes away from practically the rest of the country
and how they vote."'72 Others attributed this view to the fact
that "[ollder people are just stuck in their ways and they don't
want to change."'73
These comments are ironic on several levels. The principle of
one person, one vote now viewed as so "fundamental" to demo-
cratic government was not, of course, constitutionally established
until 1964.7 ' Moreover, cumulative voting does not violate the
principle of one person, one vote; as long as each person has
equal voting power, the formal number of votes cast is irrelevant
to the equal-protection concerns embodied in the one person, one
vote doctrine.'75 We asked whether it would matter to people in
" Interview with Agee at 7 ("Some people do [like the system], some people just
don't. A lot of people think it's unconstitutional, that it goes against the one man[,] one
vote way.")(cited in note 118); Interview with Hughes at 8 ("I would say I'm not too keen
on the seven to one vote.")(cited in note 150); Id at 1 ("I don't think the public perception
of the system is [ ] that positive .... [A] lot of people of course do not like it . . .");
Interview with McGriff at 1 ("Most people don't like the [seven] vote system. It gets away
from [one man, one vote]. It's just not right to give on[e] person seven votes to do what he
pleases with.")(cited in note 92); Interview with Julius Kelley at 1 ("People in the Cooper
area don't like the system. They don't think it's fair.")(cited in note 66); Interview with
Smith at 1 ("[It's a combination of some people who don't understand it and some people
think it's undemocratic, it's unconstitutional, you shouldn't vote more than once for one
person, regardless of the situation .... Confusion and people who do not think this is the
right way to hold elections, it's really a combination of those two things I think...
.")(cited in note 117).
" See note 170.
170 Interview with Jackson at 11-12 (cited in note 88).
171 Interview with McGriff at 1 (cited in note 92).
172 Interview with Hughes at 2 (cited in note 150).
171 Interview with Julius Kelley at 1 (cited in note 66).
174 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964).
171 In Cane v Worcester County, Md., 847 F Supp 369 (D Md 1994), the district court
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Chilton County if judicial decisions or academic experts had
made clear that cumulative voting did not violate one person, one
vote, but we were told that judicial decisions or expert opinions
would not affect the conviction of many residents.176
This ideological resistance to possessing multiple votes sug-
gests an interesting framing question about cumulative voting.
Rather than structuring the system so that each voter has seven
votes to cast, each voter could be presented as having one vote,
parts of which they could cast for different candidates; thus,
voters could be told that they could cast one-seventh of a vote for
each candidate, or that they could give their entire vote to one
candidate. Would shifting the frame from "seven votes" to "one
vote" that could be parcelled out into fractions of one-seventh
change the strong "one vote, one person" resistance to cumulative
voting experienced in Chilton County?
Yet more irony emerged when we explored whether dislike of
cumulative voting was a cover for resistance to minority political
power. We ultimately rejected this explanation. We consistently
were told-and came to believe-that, whatever complaints peo-
ple had about cumulative voting, there was general acceptance of
the need for minority representation. Many people stated that
they understood the importance of minority representation but
would have preferred drawing majority-black districts had that
been possible.'77 Indeed, one prominent member of the Board of
Education who thought cumulative voting was a terrible system
said that he had thought for a long time about what Chilton
County could have done instead. He concluded that the County
should have set aside one seat on the relevant bodies as a "mi-
nority seat," for which all voters would vote but which a minority
candidate would have to win.'78 Thus, he preferred a blatantly
imposed the plaintiff's cumulative voting scheme as a remedy for VRA Section 2 viola-
tions. The Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the district court abused its
discretion by not providing the county with adequate notice so that it could devise a
remedial scheme of its own. Cane v Worcester County, Md., 35 F3d 921 (1994). The Fourth
Circuit also acknowledged, however, that "nothing in our present understanding of the
Voting Rights Act places a principled limit on the authority of federal courts that would
prevent them from instituting a system of cumulative voting as a remedy under [Section]
2.'" Id at 927-28, quoting Holder v Hall, 114 S Ct 2581, 2601 (1994)(Thomas concurring).
The district court subsequently imposed its own cumulative voting plan, Cane v Worcester
County, Md., 874 F Supp 687 (D Md 1995), which the Fourth Circuit reversed because
neither of the parties supported cumulative voting as an option. Cane v Worcester County,
Md., 57 F3d 1065 (1995).
176 Interview with Jackson at 12 (cited in note 88).
'77 See Interview with Mike Kelley at 4 (cited in note 89).
'7' Interview with McGriff at 1-2 (cited in note 92).
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unconstitutional means-the setting aside of a seat for minority
officeholders-to a clearly constitutional one-cumulative vot-
ing-because of his strong convictions that the latter violated the
fundamental, though relatively recent, principle of one person,
one vote. Such is constitutional law in action, rather than on the
books.
Nonetheless, the widespread dislike of cumulative voting is
not to be interpreted as disapproval of the system. Even people
who did not like the system appeared to accept it because "it
works." 7 ' By working, people meant that it did produce the in-
tended result of black elected officials roughly representative of
the black population. Based on our interviews, there seemed to
be a consensus that cumulative voting was effective, necessary to
achieve minority representation, and therefore begrudgingly
accepted even while being disliked.
4. Confusion, turnout, and voter interest.
Cumulative voting elections have proceeded relatively
smoothly in Chilton County, although citizens disagree about the
extent to which voters are confused by the system. 8 ' The
County's probate judge finds cumulative voting elections more
difficult to administer than the at-large, winner-take-all elec-
tions. His primary complaint is that many voters make a mistake
on their first ballot, necessitating a second attempt and a new
ballot. The most typical mistake is overvoting; if a voter records
more than seven votes, the machine that is used to tally ballots
detects the error and rejects the ballot.'8 ' The voter then can
cast a proper ballot. The County has never run out of ballots,
however, since a ballot is printed for every registered voter de-
spite the fact that turnout is nowhere near 100 percent.
The comments of Sue Smith, former Chairperson of the
County's Republican party and former Board of Education mem-
ber, indicate that voter understanding of the system has grown
1 Interview with Hughes at 8 (cited in note 150). See also Interview with Jackson at
12 ("[E]ven though it may not be desirable, it works[,] it really, really works.")(cited in
note 88).
1"0 Compare Interview with Gray at 15-16 (cited in note 89), Interview with Hughes at
7 (cited in note 150), and Interview with Jackson at 11 (cited in note 88)(all reporting that
voter confusion is not a problem) with Interview with Smith at 1 (reporting that some
people still do not understand the system)(cited in note 117) and Interview with Robert
Martin, Probate Judge for Chilton County 1 (Jan 4, 1995)(on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum)(explaining that many voters have to vote several times due to
overvoting on their initial attempts).
"' The machine accepts ballots containing fewer than seven votes.
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over time. Some citizens are still confused about the fact that
they can vote more than once for the same or different candi-
dates. But Smith reported an increasing appreciation of cumula-
tive voting strategies; many voters have come to understand that
"if you spread your votes you're diluting your votes.""2 Voters
consciously choose between "find[ing] a good [cross section] of
people to serve on this Board, or ... mak[ing their] vote count to
help one person in particular get elected . .. ."
Moreover, the initial confusion and incredulity surrounding
cumulative voting may have had an unanticipated benefit in
Chilton County: a resurgence of interest in the political process
in general. Smith hypothesized:
When there's confusion about [the voting process] then
people are going to ask questions, or they are going to
try [to] find out about it[,] which creates more of an
interest[,] and that's bound to be good for the voting
process in the long run. I [ I don't know how many peo-
ple it has discouraged from voting .... But I know that
the talk... has been greater and people have been
more interested in it. 184
Agee reported a similar phenomenon. He believes that the sys-
tem has encouraged more people to run for office, and that this
broadening of candidates has spawned greater interest in elec-
tions.185
We were unable to gather precise statistical information on
whether cumulative voting has led to increased voter turnout.
8 6
Individuals expressed different opinions about the system's effect
on turnout; most felt that it had not made a difference." 7 Bobby
Agee, however, thought turnout had in fact increased, especially
in the black community.' s
" Interview with Smith at 2 (cited in note 117).
18 Id.
" Id at 8.
Interview with Agee at 10 (cited in note 118).
' Had we located the data, it would have been difficult to account for the additional
factors that affect turnout in order to assess cumulative voting's impact. For example,
Chilton County has closed nine polling places since 1988 because they were not accessible
to disabled people. Interview with Martin at 1 (cited in note 182).
18 Interview with Smith at 8 (cited in note 117); Interview with Mike Kelley at 8-9
(cited in note 89).
" Interview with Agee at 10 (cited in note 118).
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5. Statistical analysis of recent cumulative voting elections.
In this section, we examine the actual voting behavior of
white and black voters in the more recent cumulative voting
elections since the introductory use of the system. The new sev-
en-seat County Commission and Board of Education were first
constituted in 1988. New elections were held in 1992 for the
County Commission and in 1994 for the Board of Education. We
obtained precinct-by-precinct data on voter registration and turn-
out, broken down by race, and we used the standard statistical
technique of ecological regression analysis to generate estimates
of the overall voting behavior of black and white voters.8 9 We
analyzed the election data to determine the extent of white and
black support for white and black candidates, and also to esti-
mate how white and black voters were using their powers to
distribute multiple votes among numerous candidates.
a. Racially polarized voting patterns.
Figures 1 and 2 plot, for each precinct, the percentage of
black voters against the percentage of the vote received by black
candidates for the 1992 County Commission and 1994 Board of
Education elections. For the 1992 election, voting was polarized
Ecological regression provides estimates of average group behavior and, since
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 52-74 (1986)(opinion of the Court and plurality opinion
of Brennan), has been deemed *an appropriate statistical technique for establishing legally
relevant racially polarized voting. However, ecological regression techniques necessarily
infer individual level behavior from aggregate data. The assumptions underlying this form
of regression analysis are strong and may be somewhat unrealistic in some electoral
contexts. For example, all members of a particular group are presumed to act in a similar
manner across all precincts. While the appropriateness of using ecological regression
versus other statistical techniques has been debated in the cases and the academic
literature, it remains the standard method of analyzing racial polarization in voting-rights
litigation. See generally, Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich L Rev 1833, 1853 n 98
(1992).
In analysis of aggregate data, nonconstant variance, or heteroskedasicity, is often a
problem. In the context of election returns, large-population districts are often less variant
in their voting patterns than small-population districts. With this concern in mind, we
examined the residuals from our regressions for heteroskedasicity. Plots of the residuals
against total actual voters in the districts did not exhibit obvious heteroskedasicity. In
addition, Goldfeld-Quandt tests along electoral population lines failed to reject the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity in three of the four models we estimated. The one model
where we were unable to reject the null hypothesis, the model of 1992 black candidate
support, required further analysis. We reanalyzed this model using Weighted Least
Squares ("WLS"), with total actual voters as our weight variable, to estimate more accu-
rate standard errors for the coefficients. The results, however, were almost indistinguish-
able from the Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") model. For simplicity and consistency, we
therefore discuss all results in terms of the OLS method.
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heavily along racial lines: a strong proportional relationship
exists between the percentage of black voters and support for
black candidates in any given district.9 ' Racial voting patterns
are more difficult to interpret in the 1994 election, but black
candidates continued to poll significantly better in districts with
large numbers of black voters.'
Using the percentage of black voters in a district to predict
electoral outcomes is one means to portray the level of racial
polarization even in these cumulative voting elections. The pat-
terns of voting behavior in the 1992 County Commission election
and the 1994 Board of Education election, estimated through
regression analysis, are presented in Table 1. The "black voters"
column lists projected results given a hypothetical district com-
posed of all black voters. The "white voters" column lists estimat-
ed results for 100 percent white districts.
1 2
Based on these regression analyses of aggregate voting be-
havior, racial crossover voting appears limited in both elections,
especially in 1992. While black voter support for white candi-
dates appeared to rise in 1994, the estimates of black voting
behavior for that year are statistically uncertain.' 93
See Figure 1.
"' See Figure 2. There were seventy-eight more votes cast in Enterprise in 1994 than
there should have been, given the actual number of voters reported in that polling dis-
trict. This discrepancy is probably the result of a vote-counting mistake and appears to be
a random error. In addition, removing the Enterprise data would have almost no effect on
the regression results. The Enterprise figures are, therefore, included in all analyses in
this Article.
" Several technical aspects of the analysis should be noted. First, in 1992, both
Maplesville and Veterans Club had a significant black voting population, but black candi-
dates polled better in Maplesville. The estimates of the levels of black support for black
candidates would be affected significantly were either Maplesville or Veterans Club
dropped from the analysis. Eitimates of white voter behavior and black crossover voting,
on the other hand, would be affected only slightly. Second, the regression line in 1994 ap-
pears to be driven by the Maplesville and Veterans Club points. More importantly, the
variables of interest do not appear to be related in a true linear manner. Nonlinear terms
were added to the regression equation in an attempt to better fit the model to the data.
We decided, however, that the slight improvement in fit gained by adding quadratic terms
to the regression equation was not worth the resulting loss in explanatory simplicity.
Thus, while we acknowledge the potential nonlinearities in the 1994 data, we decided to
use simple bivariate linear regression to generate the voting behavior estimates. See note
205.
' A 95 percent confidence interval for a point estimate gives the range of points
within which, in 95 percent of repeated samples, the true point estimate will be found.
The 95 percent confidence interval of black voter support for white candidates is -11.3 to
66.3 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval for black support of black candidates is
35.6 to 90.2 percent. Because these are both extremely wide confidence intervals, we are
unable to say with certainty whether there was a high level of black crossover voting in
1994.
288 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
Our analysis of racial voting patterns in the 1992 County
Commission election is confirmed by exit-poll data others have
gathered.'" The validity of these exit polls is confirmed by the
close fit between the self-reports of the 702 voters surveyed and
the actual election outcomes. Thus, Agee received at least one
vote from 67 percent of blacks who voted in this election; among
these black voters, 85.4 percent reported casting all seven votes
for Agee. On average, then, black voters who supported Agee did
so intensely and took advantage of the "plumping" option cumu-
lative voting creates: Agee received an average of 6.28 votes from
each black voter who supported him. In contrast, the exit-poll
data confirms that Agee received little white crossover support.
Among white voters, Agee came in twelfth among all candidates,
ranking ahead only of the other black candidate and one white
Republican. Only 13.4 percent of whites cast even a single vote
for Agee. In other words, only the use of cumulative voting made
Agee's election possible. Had the at-large system remained in
place, Agee would not have stood a chance.'95 This was true de-
spite Agee's own perception that he had significant white voting
support, and the fact that many whites we interviewed reporting
having a high regard for Agee's performance in office.'96
Agee's perception of white support might be based on the
following interesting anomaly of cumulative voting. Even though
Agee received a small fraction of the total white vote and even
though a very large percentage of his total votes came from
blacks, a relatively significant number of white voters might have
voted for Agee. That is, even if Agee's electoral support came
overwhelmingly from black votes, more white voters might have
voted for him than black voters-simply because whites are such
a large majority in Chilton County. Recall that Chilton County is
11 percent black total population; that 67 percent of black voters
194 This exit-poll data is reported in Jason F. Kirksey, Richard L. Engstrom, and
Edward Still, Shaw v. Reno and New Election Systems: The Cumulative Voting Alterna-
tive, Voting Rights Review 10 (Spring 1995).
"'1 This assumes that black and white voting preferences for the black and white
candidates running in 1992 would not have been significantly different in an at-large
election than they were in the cumulative-voting election. Based on the pre-1992 patterns
of racially polarized voting, that assumption certainly appears reasonable.
" See Interview with Julius Kelley at 2 ("Agee is the most intelligent and most edu-
cated man on the commission.")(cited in note 66).
Based on the exit-poll data, the second black candidate in the general election, Rob-
ert Binion (who was not elected), received a vote from 32.9 percent of black voters; of
these, 78.7 percent cast all seven votes for him. Kirksey, Engstrom, & Still, Voting Rights
Review at 12 (cited in note 196).
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voted for Agee; and that on average, these voters gave him 6.28
votes each. If only 13.4 percent of white voters voted for Agee
and on average gave him only one vote each, Agee would have
had more white voters voting for him than blacks. To see why,
suppose 1,000 voters; if 11 percent of these are black, and 67
percent of them vote for Agee and give him 6.28 votes each, then
Agee would receive 462 total votes from 73 black supporters. He
would receive 119 total votes from 119 white voters. Thus, 80
percent of the total votes cast for Agee would come from black
voters, but 62 percent of those who voted for him would be white.
How would a candidate in a cumulative voting election likely
perceive and define his or her support-in terms of voters or
votes cast? With cumulative voting, voting can be, extremely po-
larized along racial lines (in terms of total votes cast), yet the
pool of those who support a black candidate can include a rela-
tively large percentage of white voters.
White crossover voting, however, did increase slightly but
significantly since cumulative voting was initiated in 1988. Re-
ported data on the 1988 elections estimate that Agee received 1.5
percent of the white vote.197 We estimate that he received 3.4
percent of the white vote in 1992. Agee and the second black
candidate in the 1992 general election received similar levels of
white voter support, as estimated in Figures 3 and 4.19' Thus,
Agee did receive twice as much white support in 1992 as in 1988,
even though the absolute level of that support still remained
extremely low.
The two black candidates running for the Board of Education
in 1994, on the other hand, polled very differently in white dis-
tricts. Hill received strong black support but had little backing
from predominantly white districts.'99 Reed, on the other hand,
received more support from heavily white districts than districts
with large numbers of black voters. °0 Reed's white support was
particularly strong in the Jemison Town Hall precinct, where he
teaches in the local high school. He has been well-known and
respected for years in the area of Jemison. He served on the City
197 Still, Cumulative Voting and Limited Voting in Alabama, in Rule & Zimmerman,
eds, United States Electoral Systems at 194 (cited in note 126).
198 The candidates show similar patterns of black voter support, except in Maplesville,
where Agee polled 28.4 percentage points higher than Binion. As a result, Agee's estimat-
ed support from black voters is considerably higher than Binion's. Both candidates,
however, have extremely low levels of crossover support.
"' See Figure 5.
200 See Figure 6.
241] • 289
290 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
Council in the mid-1980s and was elected Mayor Pro-Tern. 2 1
Ironically, after his election the local paper reported that no
black had ever been elected to the City Council-apparently
because the reporter did not know that Reed was black.2 2
But even if the Jemison Town Hall results are excluded,
Reed polls higher than any other black candidate in districts
with greater than 90 percent white voting population. Among all
the black candidates in the elections we studied for the County
Commission and Board of Education, Reed was the only one with
substantial white crossover support. 3
b. Voter turnout and votes cast.
Some political scientists and advocates have argued that
alternative voting systems tend to increase voter turnout.'
°4
White voter turnout remained stable across the two elections. In
both 1992 and 1994, about 65 percent of registered white voters
came to the polls. Black voter turnout, on the other hand, ap-
pears to have dropped almost 15 percentage points from the
County Commission elections in 1992 to the Board of Education
elections in 1994. We can speculate on the causes for this relative
decline,0 5 but we do not have enough information to provide a
reliable explanation.
Relative turnout is not the only variable which may have an
effect on the voting power of particular groups in a cumulative
201 Interview with Mike Kelly at 3-4 (cited in note 89).
202 Interview with Eddie Reed, Member of the Board of Education 1 (Nov 11, 1994Xon
file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
As Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate, the pattern of support for the two black candi-
dates in the 1994 election differs greatly. Thus, the 1994 "black candidate vote" variable is
an amalgamation of data from two unrelated distributions. Combining the Hill and Reed
results may, therefore, be an inappropriate use of the data. In light of this fact and given
the nonlinearities in Figure 2, see note 194, the patterns of candidate support in 1994 al-
most certainly should be examined separately for Hill and Reed. The statistical results
presented in Table 1 should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
' See Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Represen-
tative Democracy 152 (The Free Press, 1994)("[Bly restoring the link between representa-
tion and voting, alternative election systems encourage voter participation.')(cited in note
53); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 Va L Rev
1413, 1471 (1991)("[I]ncumbents will find it necessary to mobilize voter interest and
participation in an election, a task that will require incumbents to develop substantive
programs and proposals.")(cited in note 54).
' For example, black voter turnout nationwide dropped dramatically between the
presidential election in 1992 and the congressional elections in 1994. See Michael
Kranish, Black Leaders Miffed as Clinton Seeks Center, Boston Globe 1 (July 10, 1995);
Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, Hill Democrats, Clinton No Longer Share Road Map,
Baltimore Sun 2A (June 17, 1995); Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Clinton's Political Hopes Go
South, Christ Sci Mon 1 (Mar 30, 1995).
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voting system. In both 1992 and 1994, neither blacks nor whites
tended to cast all seven votes allotted to them. On average, vot-
ers in all-white districts cast about six votes in both the County
Commission and Board of Education elections. In 1992, statistical
analysis suggests that black voters, on average, cast only five of
their allotted votes."6 None of our interviews suggested such a
disparity between white and black voters' use of the full range of
votes permitted, and thus we have no explanation for this appar-
ent disparity. Whatever its source, however, it was short-lived.
By 1994, black voters were casting as many of their allotted votes
as white voters in the Board of Education election.2 °7
6. Partisan side effects and fringe candidates.
Interestingly, cumulative voting in Chilton County has indi-
rectly weakened partisan campaigning in ways we did not see
predicted in the literature. In a general election under the cumu-
lative voting system to fill the seven-seat County Commission,
each party runs seven candidates. When the parties distribute
sample ballots or otherwise provide advice about how their sup-
porters should vote, the major parties recommend casting one
vote each for the party's seven candidates.
For any individual candidate, however, the optimal strategy
is different. Each candidate would like to have as many total
votes cast for him or her as possible. Thus, the interests of par-
ties and their candidates diverge under cumulative voting. In the
first cumulative voting election, most candidates asked for only
one vote and followed the party strategy of recommending that
voters distribute the remainder of their votes for the party's oth-
er candidates. But by subsequent elections, candidates learned
the importance of concentrated support. Many candidates
therefore began to distribute their own sample ballots in which
they asked voters for all seven votes.2 °s In turn, political parties
206 See Table 1. The results of our ecological regression analysis could be consis-
tent-and are not obviously inconsistent-with data others have reported based on exit
polls. Thus, Kirksey, Engstrom, and Still report that in the 1992 election, 67.1 percent of
black voters voted for Agee and these voters gave him an average of 6.28 votes each; 32.9
percent of black voters cast a vote for Robert Binion, the other black candidate, and 78.7
percent of these voters gave Binion all seven votes. Kirksey, Engstrom, & Still, Voting
Rights Review at 12 (cited in note 196). If the 22.3 percent of black voters who voted for
Binion but did not give him seven votes instead gave him, on average, only one vote, then
black voters in the jurisdiction as a whole would have used on average 4.8 of their seven
votes. Thus, our finding that black voters in the 1992 general election only used five of
their seven votes, on average, is consistent with the exit-poll data reported thus far.
207 See Table 1.
20" Interview with Jackson at 13 (cited in note 88); Interview with Mike Kelley at 2
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have cut back on sample ballots that recommend vote dispersion;
in 1994, the Republican party urged voters to pick one Republi-
can candidate and to give that candidate all seven of their
votes.2" Several County leaders reported that in ways like this,
cumulative voting has begun to erode traditional party politics.
Candidates increasingly tend to run as individuals, rather than
as representatives of parties.210 Those who noticed this effect of
cumulative voting viewed it as a benefit at the local-government
level; the new system was perceived to be leading voters to elect
candidates based more on individual qualities than in previous
elections.2 ' Of course, in another sense cumulative voting has
revitalized party politics by helping Republicans to break the mo-
nopoly on local political power that Democrats long held under
the traditional majority-rule system.
A longstanding concern about cumulative voting is that it
enables the election of extremist or fringe candidates. 2 Be-
cause the system is neutral with respect to the minorities it em-
powers, any sufficiently large minority that votes cohesively can,
in principle, attain one seat. In addition to empowering racial,
partisan, and gender minorities, the concern has been that the
system also will empower intense ideological minorities-groups
of voters with extreme political views on specific issues or a set of
issues.
After seven years, there is no evidence of this problem aris-
ing in Chilton County. While the potential for election of fringe
candidates exists in theory, it has not occurred in practice.
Whether there is any general lesson in Chilton County's failure
to elect extremist candidates must be left to speculation. Perhaps
political and cultural forces particular to Chilton County make it
a generally moderate area; some observers reported that most
people, white and black, were "in the middle" and "rather conser-
(cited in note 89).
209 Interview with Smith at 2-3 (cited in note 117).
210 Interview with Jackson at 13 (cited in note 88).
211 See Interview with Mike Kelley at 3 ("It's almost created something that I like,
and that is, it's almost done away with politics as a party because you don't ask to sup-
port the party ticket anymore[.] [Y]ou say '[viote for me seven times.' That means that all
seven Democrats and all seven Republicans are running against each other. They're not
running by Democratic opponent or Republican opponent, they're running against peo-
ple.")(cited in note 89).
212 See Van Biema, Time at 43 (cited in note 124); Ferdinand A. Hermens, Representa-
tion and Proportional Representation, in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds,
Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives 15, 21 (Praeger, 1984)(cited in note
55).
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vative."1 On the other hand, it might result from structural
features concerning the nature of local-government politics and
elections, in which case Chilton County's experience might be of
greater predictive value for other local governments contemplat-
ing alternative voting systems. Local-government elections tend
to be pragmatic, rather than ideological, and local officeseekers
have numerous incentives to fit themselves within the existing
party structure-whether for reasons of financial and other sup-
port, future political prospects for higher office, or other consider-
ations. Thus, although cumulative voting theoretically does give
fringe candidates better electoral prospects, other structural
features of local elections might moderate this possibility.
In fact, some Chilton County observers believe cumulative
voting actually tends to produce more centrist candidates-at
least more centrist minority candidates-than the alternative of
"safe" minority districts. Bobby Agee, the most successful minori-
ty candidate, is considered a moderate. Robert Binion, considered
more radical, has been unsuccessful twice in seeking a County
Commission seat despite his endorsement by and affiliation with
the ADC, the statewide black political organization. The Execu-
tive Director of the ADC speculated that Binion and other more
radical black candidates would have a better chance of being
elected in a majority-minority single-member district.214 Wheth-
er this is so depends on the distribution of preferences among
white and black voters for these two candidates,1 5 as well as
the geographic distribution of the black voters who supported the
two candidates. Based on exit polls, 67.1 percent of black voters
cast a vote for the more "moderate" Agee, compared to only 32.9
percent for the more "radical" Binion.2"s Thus, the claim that
the ADC-supported Binion would have stood a better chance in a
majority-black district would require black voters to shift their
21' Interview with Jackson at 4 ("[W]e don't tend to have fringe[-]type candidates for
office here.... [WMe don't have-on the white side-we don't have the white extremists,
and on the black side we don't have the black extremists.")(cited in note 88).
214 Interview with Gray at 7 (cited in note 89).
It also depends on whether those preferences would remain the same regardless of
which voting rules were in use. That is, districted elections tend to focus voters on head-
to-head competition between two or more candidates, whether in the primary or general
election. Cumulative-voting elections do not directly pit individual candidates against
each other. The different ways the two voting systems focus voters' attention might influ-
ence the preferences voters have for different candidates in ways that require further
exploration before conclusions could be drawn about whether safe districts or cumulative
voting, if either, tend to produce more centrist minority candidates.
216 Kirksey, Engstrom, & Still, Voting Rights Review at 12 (cited in note 196).
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preferences dramatically when voting in a black-majority territo-
rial district. Given the magnitude of the shift that would have
been required in Chilton County, it seems likely that the more
moderate Agee would have defeated Binion even in a single-
member district race.
7. Problems with cumulative voting's at-large feature.
Before cumulative voting was adopted, Chilton County used
at-large elections for the County Commission and Board of Edu-
cation. This at-large system retained, however, one attribute of a
districted system: residency requirements for candidates. Voters
throughout the County voted for each seat, but candidates were
required to run for specific seats from specific residency districts.
Cumulative voting replaces districted elections and necessarily
does away with residency districts. As a result, a concern is
whether the move toward at-large elections has entailed any
significant costs associated with the loss of individual districts.
One specific fear, expressed at the time the system was in-
troduced, was that elected representatives would be
disproportionately concentrated in more densely populated parts
of the County, such as, the city of Clanton. In practice, however,
this problem has not materialized. Candidates have continued to
be elected from all parts of the County.217 Perhaps voters in dif-
ferent areas concentrate their votes on candidates from their
areas, or perhaps candidates tend to focus their campaigning on
different areas. Whatever the dynamics, the different areas of the
County all continue to be represented under the cumulative vot-
ing system.
A more significant cost, however, has been the decline in
specific geographic links between constituents and elected repre-
sentatives. Legislators often serve an "ombudsman" role in which
they serve as intermediaries in conflicts between their constitu-
ents and government agencies.21 s The poor and minorities tend
to be most dependent on legislators for this role, for they typical-
ly lack the traditional alternative mechanisms, such as lobbyists,
lawyers, or personal contacts, for resolving these conflicts. Politi-
217 Interview with Jackson at 3-4 (cited in note 88); Interview with Gray at 5 (cited in
note 89).
218 See Malcolm E. Jewell, Representation in State Legislatures 146-49 (University
Press of Kentucky, 1982). Our discussion in this paragraph draws from Samuel
Issacharoff's contribution to the 1994 University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium. See
Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U
Chi Legal F 205, 230-31 (cited in note 63).
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cal scientists have concluded that constituents more easily iden-
tify representatives from single-member districts than at-large
systems, although the studies do not examine legislators elected
through alternative voting systems, such as cumulative vot-
ing.219 We discovered, however, that cumulative voting does cre-
ate problems of this sort. The lack of a direct tie between an
individual representative and constituents was perhaps the most
serious disadvantage of the shift to cumulative voting that we
discovered.
Several individuals cited the abandonment of residency re-
quirements as the major problem they had experienced under
cumulative voting. A number of people commented that they did
not know to call on either the County Commission or the Board
of Education when they had an issue to discuss. In the former
system of residency districts, the representative from a particular
"district" was understood to be the person to turn to for local
problems. Sue Smith, former member of the Board of Education,
remarked:
[Y]ou lose the feeling of "this is my representative on
this Board." And I feel that way on the County Commis-
sion now. If I had a problem to speak with the County
Commission about I would call two or three of them be-
cause I don't really know which one I ought to make
contact with. I think that's a sense of frustration for the
general population .... 220
Representatives also described some costs in moving to at-
large elections. For better or worse, they now feel a general sense
of responsibility to citizens of the entire County. When asked
about the disadvantages of cumulative voting, Agee cited the at-
large feature, because "you've got more people to satisfy...
where, if you had a district you'd be concerned with just satisfy-
ing those people in that district .... ,221
211 Jewell, Representation in State Legislatures at 146-49 (cited in note 220).
Interview with Smith at 7 (cited in note 117).
' Interview with Agee at 7 (cited in note 118). Agee went on to say that this was
"really not a major problem." Id.
At the time of the cumulative-voting settlement, another change was made in the
structure of the County Commission that several people complained about, but that is not
a feature of cumulative voting per se. The County's probate judge traditionally had served
as Chairperson of the Commission. His position was full time, and his office was located
in downtown Clanton, making him accessible to the citizenry. Under the new system, the
commissioners elect a Chairperson from among themselves, meaning that the Chairper-
son, like the commissioners, serves part time, and often out of his home. Jackson cited
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8. The dynamics of racial politics.
The effect of cumulative voting.on race relations in the politi-
cal sphere beyond electoral returns and formal policies adopted
is, of course, more difficult to assess. We know that black politi-
cians have been elected to the central political bodies for the first
time, that important countywide policies are indeed more respon-
sive to the black community than before, and that Bobby Agee
has come to be highly regarded in his role as Chairperson of the
County Commission. One concern about systems like cumulative
voting, however, is that they work from the top downwards rath-
er than from the bottom upwards in the kind of coalitions they
encourage. That is, in single-member districts with only two
candidates to choose between, voters must form broad coalitions
supporting one or the other candidate. Thus, such systems are
thought to encourage linkages between different groups at the
grassroots level. Cumulative voting rewards small, cohesive
groups; rather than attempting to dissolve conflicts at the voting
level, such systems in a sense transfer those conflicts up to the
representative level. The hope is that representatives will be
better able to reach out to each other than are constituents and
that the discovery of common ground among representatives
ultimately will influence their constituents to find overlapping
consensus as well.
We have only limited information on these more nebulous
issues. As far as the white community goes, its hostility toward
the system of cumulative voting does not appear to extend to the
black candidates elected. The whites we spoke to expressed a
general acceptance of the need for the system and a general re-
spect for the presence and performance of the black officials elect-
ed through the system. Recall that Julius Kelly, a white Republi-
can elected to the County Commission, described Bobby Agee as
the most educated and talented member of the Commission.222
Several remarked that the minority community feels a "great
deal of pride" in Agee's presence on the County Commission and
admitted that black interests are better represented since his
election.22 Similar respect was expressed towards Eddie Reed,
the newest black member of the Board of Education.
this feature of the system as the source of the County's feeling that there is less day-to-
day leadership on the Commission than there previously had been, and less of an opportu-
nity for contact with the leaders. Interview with Jackson at 4 (cited in note 88). See also
Interview with Martin at 1 (cited in note 182).
See note 167.
See Interview with Jackson at 11 (cited in note 88).
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Our long conversations with Bobby Agee left the impression
that cumulative voting has provided a thoughtful advocate for
the black community and has begun to decrease racial polariza-
tion in politics. Agee reported that in his first campaign, he felt
he was considered "the black candidate." He was the only candi-
date who campaigned in black neighborhoods and when he was
elected, the other representatives viewed him as "the black
representative." 224 By the second election, however, many white
candidates had gained an appreciation for the power of the black
vote, and actively campaigned in black neighborhoods.225 In ad-
dition, Agee reported that he now receives more phone calls and
requests from white constituents than black constituents, in line
with the demographics of Chilton County.226 Agee's final com-
ment sounds almost quaint in its resonance with the civil-rights
discourse of the 1960s: people in Chilton County, he says, are
starting to "[g]et away from race, creed[,] and color."227 They are
"look[ing] at [the] ability of [the] person. "228
9. The problem of multiple minority candidates.
A recognized concern about cumulative voting is that it func-
tions best to ensure the election of a single minority candidate,
but not as well when more than one minority candidate seeks
office. This problem is more acute in jurisdictions in which the
black population is large enough to support two minority candi-
dates. Chilton County is not such a place, given its 11 percent
black population and seven-seat elective bodies. Yet even here,
we found significant evidence that cumulative voting does create
problems of intraminority competition. To the extent that these
problems turn out to be serious, however, they do not argue in
favor of abandoning alternative voting systems. Instead, they
argue in favor of more sophisticated variations of alternative
voting systems-in particular, preference (or single-transferable)
voting.
In the County Commission races, two black candidates ran in
the 1992 primary and in the 1994 primary and general elections.
Agee, who won, generally was considered more moderate than
224 Interview with Bobby Agee, Chilton County Commissioner 1 (May 9, 1994)(on file
with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
Interview with Agee at 14 (cited in note 118).
2 Id at 5. However, Agee reports that most of the calls from blacks seem to go to
him. Id at 6.
'" Interview with Agee at 1 (cited in note 226).
Id.
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Robert Binion, who lost. Binion was supported by and affiliated
with the ADC. Jerome Gray, head of the ADC, described the
problems that cumulative voting poses when more than one black
candidate runs in the midst of racially polarized voting. For ex-
ample, cumulative voting puts a premium on minority voters
being highly organized and cohesive; if minority voters disperse
their votes between two black candidates, both risk defeat. As
Gray put it, "you almost have to discourage the number of poten-
tial candidates.., in the cumulative voting system because you
[ ] know that if you've got too many running what it does in
terms of denying any black candidate [enough votes] to reach the
threshold... ,229 Thus, cumulative voting discourages the po-
litical airing of divergent positions within the black community
even when only one seat is likely to be filled by a minority can-
didate.
When more than one seat could be filled through an alterna-
tive voting system despite racially polarized voting-as in a juris-
diction with 1,000 voters, 250 of whom are black, and a ten-mem-
ber legislature23 -- the problem of intragroup competition is far
worse. With cumulative voting, it would take only ninety-one
votes to win a seat. This means that black voters would have to
form themselves into two cohesive groups of ninety-one each,
with a third cohesive group of sixty-eight that might join with
twenty-three sympathetic whites to elect a third candidate repre-
sentative of the minority community. As Richard Briffault rightly
has observed, any assumption that voters would be able to calcu-
late and execute the optimal strategy for using cumulative voting
in this kind of circumstance rests on "an unduly optimistic ap-
praisal of the ability of a large group of ordinary voters to orga-
nize itself and to assign different specific voters to different can-didates. " "
Our findings suggest that the multiple minority candidate
scenario poses a small problem for cumulative voting even at this
stage in Chilton County's experiment. The problem does not
appear to be severe, however, particularly in light of the small
black population in Chilton Courity. But for other jurisdictions
considering alternative voting systems, especially those with
2n Interview with Gray at 6 (cited in note 89).
30 This example is used in Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority at 96-97 (cited in
note 55).
"' Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95
Colum L Rev 418, 437 (1995)(cited in note 52).
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minority communities large enough to support more than one
candidate, the early signs suggest some caution. Cumulative
voting is best suited to contexts in which a group can focus its
votes on a single candidate. For other contexts, the better choice
might well be preference (or single-transferable) voting sys-
tems.232
Preference voting enables groups to rank multiple candidates
in order of preference. If a group's first preference fails to garner
enough votes to be elected, those votes are redistributed to the
group's second preference. As a result, preference voting avoids
or minimizes the problem of intergroup competition; a small
group need not vote with perfect cohesion and accurate ex ante
calculation about how to optimize its political preferences. For
example, a socially conservative black voter might give her first-
place vote to a black candidate who opposes abortion, and then, if
race dominates her views on this issue, give her second-place
vote to a pro-choice black candidate. Thus, preference voting
enables small groups to express their political differences without
the cost of fracturing themselves and losing the opportunity to
elect even one candidate. Advocates of preference voting over
cumulative voting also argue that the former is more likely to en-
courage diversity of representation, facilitate interracial political
alliances, and foster more competitive elections. 33 We further
wonder whether preference voting, in which voters perform an
act familiar to them from other contexts, would avoid the surpris-
ing perceptual problem we discovered with cumulative voting's
seeming "departure" from one person, one vote. While this is not
the place to consider fully the merits of preference voting versus
cumulative voting, we conclude from our work in Chilton County
that the problem of multiple minority candidates is likely to be
genuine under cumulative voting. As a result, in many contexts,
preference voting might well be the better alternative voting
system, at least in theory.3 4
132 See notes 50 and 52.
' For a concise and lucid presentation of the case for preference voting over cumula-
tive voting, see Briffault, 95 Colum L Rev at 436-441 (cited in note 52).
23 The most significant disadvantage of preference voting, perhaps, is that the system
is difficult to explain and even more foreign to American experience than limited voting or
cumulative voting. Any democratic voting system must be generally accepted as fair and
legitimate. The perception that preference voting is complex and unfathomable would
count against its adoption.
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10. Costs of campaigning.
A final concern about cumulative voting is that it might raise
the cost of campaigning compared to the cost of campaigning in
single-member districts. As an at-large electoral system, cumula-
tive voting might force candidates to campaign throughout the
jurisdiction, rather than in a specific district in which the can-
didate can target a small subset of voters. If so, this would be a
significant problem for cumulative voting because the minority-
preferred candidates whose representation the system seeks to
facilitate are typically least likely to be able to raise substantial
campaign funds.
Thus far, however, cumulative voting does not appear to
have increased the cost of campaigns in Chilton County. Some
candidates appear to target their campaigning to specific areas,
in effect replicating a district-based election. Others campaign
throughout the County.235 But none of the candidates indicated
that campaign expenses had been increased by the shift to cumu-
lative voting. Agee reported spending only $580 to get elected. He
also noted that under the previous system, in which candidates
were elected at large but from specific residency districts, candi-
dates still faced the same choice of seeking votes throughout the
County or in targeted areas.236 Thus, neither Agee nor other
elected officials to whom we talked provided any evidence that
cumulative voting had increased campaign costs in Chilton Coun-
ty.23
7
CONCLUSION
If significant minority representation is an important goal of
public policy, the Wishful-Thinking Route will not achieve it, at
least under current sociopolitical circumstances. Racially polar-
ized voting remains pervasive enough today (most notably in the
South where it has been studied most extensively) that any as-
' Compare Interview with Julius Kelley at 1 (describing focus of his efforts at
specific areas of Chilton County)(cited in note 66) and Interview with Mike Kelley at 5
(observing that some candidates seemed to concentrate on specific areas)(cited in note 89)
with Interview with Agee at 5-6 (noting that candidates campaign throughout Chilton
County, which is Agee's approach)(cited in note 118) and Interview with McGriff at 1
(describing himself as campaigning throughout the entire county)(cited in note 92).
26 Interview with Agee at 6 (cited in note 118).
.37 Jerome Gray, Executive Director of the ADC, did speculate that cumulative voting
might make it more expensive to run and hence more difficult for organizations like his to
recruit black candidates. But he did not seem to suggest that this problem had become
serious enough to be considered a major disadvantage of cumulative voting. Interview
with Gray at 7 (cited in note 89).
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sumption of a willingness among white voters to vote for black
candidates in significant numbers is factually inaccurate. On the
other hand, the race-conscious drawing of "safe" minority elector-
al districts has been extremely successful at creating minority
officeholders. That approach, however, also entails significant
costs. The remaining option, though less familiar in practice, is
the use of alternative voting systems, such as limited voting,
cumulative voting, and preference voting. There is no longer any
need to speculate abstractly about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these alternative voting systems. Through voluntary
settlement of VRA litigation, a significant number of local gov-
ernments throughout the United States have been using these
systems for long enough that a record of their experience is now
available.
Based on the seven-year experience with cumulative voting
in Chilton County, Alabama, we conclude that the system is
yielding most of the advantages claimed on its behalf and few of
the problems that have concerned its critics. Cumulative voting
has been quite effective, even in the face of racially polarized
voting, at bringing about minority representation-not just for
racial minorities, but for women and political minorities as well.
As black officeholding has increased, voting has become less
racially polarized, the black community has received a fairer
distribution of public services, and black residents have felt more
included in local government. Campaigning at large for the rele-
vant local offices has not become unduly expensive, nor have
fringe candidates with extremist views been elected to office.
Cumulative voting does remain widely unpopular, even after
seven years, based on the widespread perception in Chilton
County that it violates the one-person, one-vote constitutional
principle. In addition, there are costs associated with the move
back to at-large elections, which cumulative voting requires.
Voters no longer feel as clear about who "their" representative is.
But voters do not appear to be confused by the system and they
generally acknowledge that "it works": it brings about minority
representation despite racially polarized voting and the geograph-
ic dispersion of black voters.
The choice of electoral systems necessarily must be a prag-
matic one. No democratic voting system is ideal; each system
serves certain values well and others poorly.2" The question is
' See generally, Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum L
241]
302 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [ 1995:
not whether cumulative voting is without costs, but how those
costs compare to those of the available alternatives. Given the
options of majority rule, racially polarized voting, and minimal
minority representation, on the one hand, or the creation of ra-
cially defined "safe" election districts, on the other, cumulative
voting-warts and all-appears increasingly appealing, at least
for local governments, as experience with it grows. Perhaps the
Chilton Counties will become the Philadelphias of the twenty-
first century as American democracy continues the ongoing pro-
cess of self-renewal and reinvention.
Rev 2121, 2198 (1990)("Political institutions and decision procedures... specify whose
views will be counted in determining the collective will and define the means by which
the collective will can be recognized. No uniquely 'rational' institutional architecture
exists for constructing that will. Each bundle of institutions and practices represents a
distinct social construction of the collective will .... Political communities might choose
for many reasons to determine their collective will through one particular set of institu-
tions and decisions rules." (emphasis omitted)(internal citations omitted)).
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Table 1
1992: County Commission Election
W
Actual Percentage of
Registered Electorate Voting
Estimated Percentage of
Votes for White Candidates
Estimated Percentage of
Votes for Black Candidates
Estimated Percentage of
Votes Not Cast
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
HITE VOTERS
65.0
BLACK VOTERS
66.1
83.5
(0.9)
3.4
(0.6)
13.1
(1.1)
7.0
(5.1)
62.9
(3.5)
30.1
(6.5)
1994: Board of Education Election
Wl
Actual Percentage of
Registered Electorate Voting
Estimated Percentage of
Votes for White Candidates
Estimated Percentage of
Votes for Black Candidates
Estimated Percentage of
Votes Not Cast
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
HITE VOTERS
64.3
BLACK VOTERS
51.4
76.9
(2.7)
8.9
(1.9)
14.2
(1.9)
27.5
(18.2)
62.9
(12.9)
9.6
(12.8)
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FIGURE 1
1992 County Commission Election
Black Voter Percentage vs. Black Candidate Vote Share
0 10 20 30 40 50
Black Voter Percentage by Precinct
Each point on the graph represents a single precinct. From left to right, the precincts are: Lay
Dam, Enterprise, Cane Creek, Union Grove, Pletcher, Providence N/W, Providence, Clanton
Facility Building, Collins Chapel, Mineral Springs, Library Rep District #72, Mars Hill,
Isabella, Courthouse, Old Grammer School, Thomsby Town Hall, Fairview, Cooper, Mt. Creek,
Jemison Town Hall, Shoults, Stanton, Kincheon, Verbena, Macedonia, Maplesville, Veterans
Club.
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FIGURE 2
1994 Board of Education Election
Black Voter Percentage vs. Black Candidate Vote Share
0 10 20 30 40 50
Black Voter Percentage by Precinct
Each point on the graph represents a single precinct. From left to right, the precincts are:
Providence E. Chilton, Collins Chapel. Union Grove. Providence N/W. Cane Creek. Library,
Clanton Facility Building. Mars Hill, Thomsby Towvn Hall, Courthouse. South Chilton Fire
Station, Enterprise, Jemison Town Hall. Fairview. Verbena. Isabella, Maplesville, Veterans
Club.
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FIGURE 3
1992 County Commission Election
Black Voter Percentage vs. Agee Vote Share
0 10" 20 30 40 50
Black Voter Percentage by Precinct
Each point on the graph represents a single precinct. From left to right, the precincts are: Lay
Dam, Enterprise, Cane Creek, Union Grove, Pletcher, Providence N/W, Providence, Clanton
Facility Building, Collins Chapel, Mineral Springs, Library Rep District #72, Mars Hill,
Isabella, Courthouse, Old Grammer School, Thomsby Town Hall, Fairview, Cooper, Mt. Creek,
Jemison Town Hall, Shoults, Stanton, Kincheon, Verbena, Macedonia, Maplesville, Veterans
Club.
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FIGURE 4
1992 County Commission Election
Black Voter Percentage vs. Binion Vote Share
* Verbena
Macedonia
Ve t rns C l,
Maplesville
0 I I I I
0 10 20 30 40 50
Black Voter Percentage by Precinct
Each point on the graph represents a single precinct. From left to right, the precincts are: Lay
Dam, Enterprise, Cane Creek, Union Grove, Pletcher, Providence N/W, Providence, Clanton
Facility Building, Collins Chapel, Mineral Springs, Library Rep District #72, Mars Hill,
Isabella, Courthouse, Old Grammer School, Thomsby Town Hall, Fairview, Cooper, Mt. Creek,
Jemison Town Hall, Shoults, Stanton, Kincheon, Verbena, Macedonia, Maplesville, Veterans
Club.
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FIGURE 5
1994 Board of Education Election
Black Voter Percentage vs. Hill Vote Share
Veterns Club
Maplesv
PJT n Hall.
*Mars Hill .
I I I 4
0 10 20 30 40 ,50
Black Voter Percentage by Precinct
Each point on the graph represents a single precinct. From left to right, the precincts are:
Providence E. Chilton, Collins Chapel, Union Grove, Providence N/W, Cane Creek, Library,
Clanton Facility Building, Mars Hill, Thomsby Town Hall, Courthouse, South Chilton Fire
Station, Enterprise, Jemison Town Hall, Fairview, Verbena, Isabella, Maplesville, Veterans
Club.
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FIGURE 6
1994 Board of Education Election
Black Voter Percentage vs. Reed Vote Share
A0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Black Voter Percentage by Precinct
Each point on the graph represents a single precinct. From left to right, the precincts are:
Providence E. Chilton, Collins Chapel, Union Grove, Providence N/W, Cane Creek, Library,
Clanton Facility Building, Mars Hill, Thomsby Town Hall, Courthouse, South Chilton Fire
Station, Enterprise, Jemison Town Hall, Fairview, Verbena, Isabella, Maplesville, Veterans
Club.
J. Town Hall.
- * Mars Hill
Veterns Club.
Maplesville
241] 309
O THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
R*d - ---- -r ~d l
g P
CUMULATIVE VOTING
I- II! I Ii I °I I o 11 I
241]
312 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
ALABAMA DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE
Chilton County
OFFICIAL GUIDE BALLOT
GENERAL ELECTION
November 8, 1994
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OFFICIAL SAMPLE BALLOT OF THE
ALABAMA NEW SOUTH COALITION
The Alabama New South Coalition recommends those candidates marked as its slate for this election.
We believe that they would best represent your interests. Thank you for considering our recommendations.
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